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Abstract 
Cognitive theories of depression posit that after a negative event or mood 
state, those vulnerable to the disorder automatically impose negative interpretations 
on ambiguous information. However, empirical research on depression-linked 
interpretive biases has yielded mixed results, likely due to flawed experimental 
paradigms and statistical techniques that do not adequately control for anxiety.  
Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation (CBM-I) is an innovative research 
paradigm that involves inducing interpretive biases in an experimentally controlled 
manner. The current study is the first to assess whether cognitive bias modification 
influences interpretation differently according to vulnerability to depression. 
Individuals scoring lower and higher on a depression inventory judged the relatedness 
of either neutrally valenced (e.g. book-read) or negatively valenced (e.g. sick-vomit) 
word-pairs. They then made judgements about homophone word-pairs, in which the 
first word could be interpreted as either neutral in meaning (e.g. dye-ink) or negative 
in meaning (e.g. die-death).  At the later stages of processing all individuals, 
regardless of depression scores, resolved ambiguous word-pairs in a training-
congruent manner, consistent with previous CBM-I studies. However, in the early 
stages of processing, those scoring higher, but not lower in the depression inventory, 
were uniquely receptive to negative context training, such that they were more likely 
to interpret ambiguous word-pairs in a negative as opposed to neutral manner. This 
finding is crucially important, as it helps to clarify theoretical debate in the literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE TIME COURSE OF INDUCED INTERPRETIVE BIASES 
 
3 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Gina Grimshaw. I would not have 
come this far without your expertise, guidance, and ongoing support. I would also like 
to give a big thank you to Hazel Godfrey, for assistance with data collection, proof 
reading, and thought provoking discussion. Lastly, I would like to thank my family 
and friends, especially my boys, Marcel and Nathan, for keeping things in 
perspective.   
 
 
THE TIME COURSE OF INDUCED INTERPRETIVE BIASES 
 
4 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 2 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................... 3 
List of Tables and Figures ......................................................................................... 6 
Introduction. .............................................................................................................. 7 
 Depression and Information Processing Biases ................................................. 7 
 Tasks Used to Assess Interpretive Biases in Depression .................................. 10 
 Self-report tasks ..................................................................................... 10 
 Homophone spelling tasks ...................................................................... 10 
 Text comprehension tasks ...................................................................... 12 
 Semantic priming tasks .......................................................................... 14 
 Blink-reflex task .................................................................................... 15 
 Time Course of Interpretive Biases ................................................................. 16 
 Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation (CBM-I) ................................. 20 
Experiment 1 ............................................................................................................24 
Method .....................................................................................................................25 
 Participants ..................................................................................................... 25 
 Stimuli ............................................................................................................ 26 
 Questionnaires. ...................................................................................... 26 
 Prime-target pairs in context training...................................................... 26 
 Homophones .......................................................................................... 27 
 Homophone prime-target pairs ............................................................... 28 
 Recordings ............................................................................................. 28 
 Procedure ....................................................................................................... 29 
Results and Discussion ............................................................................................ 30 
 Accuracy ........................................................................................................ 31 
Response Times ............................................................................................... 35 
Experiment 2 ............................................................................................................36 
Method .....................................................................................................................37 
 Participants ..................................................................................................... 37 
 Stimuli ............................................................................................................ 37 
 Procedure ....................................................................................................... 37 
Results and Discussion .............................................................................................37 
 Accuracy ........................................................................................................ 38 
THE TIME COURSE OF INDUCED INTERPRETIVE BIASES 
 
5 
Response Times ............................................................................................... 41 
General Discussion ...................................................................................................41 
 Previous Research .......................................................................................... 43 
 Early stages of processing ...................................................................... 43 
 Later stages of processing ...................................................................... 46 
 Potential Mechanisms Underlying Strategically Induced Biases ...................... 48 
 Demand effects ...................................................................................... 48 
 Undetected mood changes ...................................................................... 48 
 Emotional category priming ................................................................... 49 
 Transfer of processing ............................................................................ 50 
 Future directions ............................................................................................. 52 
 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 55 
References................................................................................................................57 
Appendix A ..............................................................................................................65 
Appendix B ..............................................................................................................66 
Appendix C ..............................................................................................................67 
Appendix D ..............................................................................................................68 
Appendix E ..............................................................................................................69 
 
THE TIME COURSE OF INDUCED INTERPRETIVE BIASES 
 
6 
List of Tables and Figures 
Table 1.  Depression and Anxiety Scores for Individuals in Experiment 1 (800ms 
SOA)..……………………………………………………………………....40 
Table 2. Accuracy of Homophone Prime-Target Pairs for Individuals in  
Experiment 1 (800ms SOA)     ………………………………………….....41 
Table 3. Reaction Times to Correctly Identified Related Targets for Individuals in 
Experiment 1 (800ms SOA).……………………………………………….46 
Table 4. Depression and Anxiety Scores for Individuals in Experiment 2……….....48 
Table 5. Accuracy of Homophone Prime-Target Pairs for Individuals in       
Experiment  2 (400ms SOA)    …………………………………………….49 
Table 6. Reaction Times to Correctly Identified Related Targets for Individuals in 
Experiment 2 (400ms SOA).    …………………………………………….52 
Figure 1. Sensitivity (d’) to homophone prime-target pairs at the 800ms SOA for 
individuals in neutral and negative context training.  ……………………..43 
Figure 2. Criterion values (c) for homophone prime-target pairs at the 800ms SOA, 
for individuals in neutral and negative context training.….……………….44 
Figure 3. Criterion values (c) for homophone prime-target pairs at the 800ms SOA, 
for individuals lower and higher in depression..………………..…………45 
Figure 4. Sensitivity (d’) to homophone prime-target pairs at the 400ms SOA, for 
individuals lower and higher in depression, and in neutral and negative 
context training.….………………………………………………………..51 
THE TIME COURSE OF INDUCED INTERPRETIVE BIASES 
 
7 
The Time-Course of Induced Interpretive Biases in Healthy Individuals Varying 
in Depressive Symptoms 
You see your partner hugging an attractive stranger on the other side of the 
road – who do you suppose this person is? Life is full of scenarios that can be 
interpreted in different ways; yet without necessarily realising it we use cues to make 
sense of the world around us. Typically, healthy individuals interpret ambiguous 
information in a positive manner. For example, they might use context (it’s the middle 
of the afternoon) and likelihood (their partner has always been faithful) to conclude 
that the attractive stranger is a long lost friend. However, our interpretation can be 
influenced by many factors, including our own emotional state, and may play a role in 
mood disorders.   
Cognitive theories of depression suggest that following a negative event or 
mood state, some individuals are more likely to interpret ambiguous information in a 
negative manner, and that this negative bias plays a causal role in the onset of the 
disorder (e.g. Beck, 1976, 1987, 2008; Beck & Clark, 1988; Bower, 1981; DeRaedt & 
Coster, 2010;  Pearsons & Miranda, 1992; Sheppard & Teasdale, 2004). However, 
empirical research on depression-linked interpretive biases has yielded mixed results 
(Bisson & Sears, 2007; Butler & Mathews, 1983; Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Lawson & 
MacLeod, 1999; Lawson, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2002; Mogg, Bradbury, & 
Bradley, 2006; Sears, Bisson, & Neilson, 2010; Wenzlaff & Eisenburg, 2001). One 
reason for this inconsistency is that methodologies have not been driven by a 
theoretical understanding of how emotional ambiguity is processed in healthy 
individuals. The current study focuses on the nature of interpretive biases in healthy 
individuals, and relates this understanding to theories of depression. Several questions 
are explored. First, does prior access to negative information lead healthy individuals 
to interpret ambiguous information in a negative manner? Second, if so, are some 
individuals more sensitive to this manipulation than others? Lastly, what is the time-
course of interpretive biases – do they reflect a rapid onset of activation of related 
concepts, or a slower, more controlled selection process?      
Depression and Information Processing Biases 
 Depression is the most common psychiatric disorder in the world, estimated to 
affect around 121 million people (World Health Organization [WHO], 2011a). 
Individuals with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) are affected by a constellation of 
cognitive, behavioural and emotional symptoms, including a pervasive negative 
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mood, feelings of worthlessness and guilt, and loss of interest and pleasure in 
everyday activities. Individuals with MDD also experience changes in appetite and 
sleep patterns, suffer from fatigue, have little or no energy, and may exhibit 
psychomotor agitation (American Psychiatric Association [DSM-IV-TR], 2000). Of 
serious concern, depression is a major risk factor for suicide, which is one of the three 
leading causes of death, across the world, in individuals aged 15-44 (WHO, 2011b). 
Despite several treatment options, there is a high rate of relapse (Judd, 1997); in fact, 
depression is predicted to be the second leading contributor to the global burden of 
disease by the year 2020 (Murray & Lopez, 1996; WHO, 2011a). For these reasons, 
research in the area of depression is imperative. Several cognitive theories of 
depression exist; one of the most influential comes from Aaron Beck. 
Beck’s (1976) original cognitive theory stated that individuals who experience 
early childhood loss, failures, or rejections may develop dysfunctional belief systems.  
After a negative event or mood state, these individuals activate negative schema about 
the self, world, and future, which result in automatic and persistent information 
processing biases that can ultimately lead to depression. For example, imagine your 
partner breaks up with you. An individual with dysfunctional belief systems may 
activate maladaptive schemas such as, I am not worthy of my partner, I will never be 
good enough for anyone, and my future is doomed. These negative schemas might 
lead the individual to attend to negative information in the environment, show 
enhanced memory for negative events, and interpret ambiguous situations in a 
negative manner, which eventually results in depressive symptoms. Recent 
modifications to Beck’s theory (e.g., Beck, 2008) acknowledge that vulnerability to 
depression does not simply arise from dysfunctional belief systems, but rather can 
involve an interaction between genetic (e.g. short variant of the serotonin transporter 
gene), neurochemical (e.g. hypersensitive amygdala), and cognitive factors (e.g. 
information processing biases). 
 In order to test key assumptions of cognitive theories, researchers have 
focused on the associations between depression and negative information processing 
biases, specifically in the domain of attention, memory, and interpretation (for a 
review see Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). Thus far, a negative attentional bias, that is, 
selectively attending to negative information, has been associated with clinical 
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depression (Gotlib, Krasnopervoa, Yue, & Joormann, 2004) and dysphoria1 (Koster, 
De Raedt, Leyman, & De Lissnyder, 2010). Negative attentional biases have also 
been reported in individuals vulnerable to depression (i.e. daughters of depressed 
mothers; Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007) and individuals remitted from depression 
(Joormann & Gotlib, 2007), but only after they have been induced into a negative 
mood. Similarly, a negative memory bias, that is, enhanced memory for negative 
events, has been associated with clinical depression (Bradley, Mogg, & Williams, 
1995; Gilboa-Schechtman, Erhard-Weiss, & Jeczemien, 2002; Ridout, Astell, Reid, 
Glen, & O’Carroll, 2003), dysphoria (Denny & Hunt, 1992, Ridout, Noreen, & Johal, 
2009), and healthy individuals induced into a negative mood (Ridout et al., 2009). 
However, the association between negative interpretive biases (consistently resolving 
ambiguous information in a negative manner) and depression remains inconclusive.  
          Several problems arise when testing for depression-linked interpretive biases. 
First, is designing an appropriate task. Just because an individual consistently selects 
negative meanings of ambiguous information, does not necessarily mean they possess 
a negative interpretive bias. Rather, they could process all possible meanings, but 
have a greater tendency to report negative meanings (negative reporting bias). 
Researchers who test interpretive biases in mood disorders tend to use self-report, 
homophone-spelling, text comprehension, and semantic priming tasks. Each of these 
tasks has advantages and disadvantages, which will be extensively discussed. A 
second problem, that arises when testing for depression-linked interpretation biases, is 
accounting for anxiety (a problem in all depression specific studies; for a discussion 
see Beuke, Fischer, & McDowall, 2003).  Depression and anxiety are highly co-
morbid (Rapaport, 2001). That is, those who exhibit depressive symptoms are also 
highly likely to exhibit anxiety symptoms.  The field of anxiety-linked interpretive 
biases is well established. Those with high levels of anxiety have consistently been 
shown to have a negative-interpretive bias, often specific to threat (e.g. Byrne & 
Eysenck, 1993; Calvo & Castillo, 1997; Hadwin, Frost, French, & Richards, 1997; 
MacLeod & Cohen, 1993; Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 1989; Richards & French, 
1992; Russo, Patterson, Roberson, & Stevenson 1996).  Therefore, if depression 
                                               
1 The term dysphoria is used to refer to non-diagnosed negative affect. For example, an individual who 
scores in the clinical range on a depression questionnaire would be referred to as dysphoric. Whereas 
an individuals who scores in the clinical range on a depression questionnaire and had been diagnosed 
with MDD by a clinician, would be referred to as depressed.  
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levels are measured but anxiety is not taken into consideration, there is no way of 
knowing whether interpretive biases obtained are due to depression, anxiety, or both. 
Tasks Used to Assess Interpretive Biases in Depression 
Self-report tasks. 
The first studies to test for depression-linked interpretive biases tended to 
measure interpretation through self-report. Specifically, participants read ambiguous 
scenarios, and made subjective decisions in regard to which interpretations they 
believed were likely. One classic study of this type comes from Butler and Mathews 
(1983). Groups of anxious, depressed and control participants were presented with 
descriptions of ambiguous situations. For example, you wake up with a startle in the 
middle of the night, thinking you heard a noise, but all is quiet. They were then 
presented with an open ended question (e.g. what do you think woke you up) followed 
by three possible explanations. One of these explanations always included a 
threatening interpretation (e.g. it could be a burglar). Participants were required to 
rank the three possible explanations in order of likelihood. Butler and Mathews found 
that both anxious and depressed participants were more likely than controls to select 
the threatening interpretation of the ambiguous scenarios. The authors inferred that 
this was evidence of a negative interpretive bias. Self-report tasks, however, have 
been extensively criticized, as it is impossible to determine whether negative biases 
are actually interpretive or responsive (MacLeod & Mathews, 1991; Mogg, Bradley, 
Miller, & Potts, 1994). Responses are valenced, and participants are presented with all 
alternatives and given plenty of time to choose which one they prefer. They could, for 
example initially interpret the ambiguous scenario in a neutral or positive manner, but 
when shown all possibilities, choose to select the negative interpretation.  
Homophone spelling tasks. 
Another task used to assess interpretive biases in depression is the homophone 
spelling task. Words that are pronounced the same, but differ in semantic meaning 
and spelling are referred to as homophones; for example carrot/carat. In homophone 
spelling tasks, researchers typically select homophones that have an emotional 
meaning and a neutral meaning; for example dye/die (neutral & emotionally negative) 
and piece/peace (neutral & emotionally positive). In the task itself, participants hear 
the homophone, and after a delay, are asked to write down the word they heard. 
Responses are coded as neutral (neutral spelling) or emotional (emotional spelling). 
Homophone spelling tasks have been extensively tested in the field of anxiety, and 
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have revealed consistent results. Negative biases have been associated with clinical 
anxiety (Mathews et al., 1989) and self-reported trait anxiety (Byrne & Eysenck, 
1993; Hadwin et al., 1997; Richards & French 1992; Russo et al., 1996). Further, 
Barazzone and Davey (2009) have reported mood congruent effects after angry, 
anxious, happy, and neutral mood inductions. For example, those induced into an 
angry or anxious mood were more likely to interpret homophones in a negative 
manner. Notably, using a homophone spelling task, Blanchette and Richards (2003) 
have reported that when contextual cues become available to individuals (e.g. they see 
the word death before they hear the word dye/die), mood-congruent effects dissipate.  
Only a handful of studies have used the homophone spelling task to test for 
depression-linked interpretive biases. Wenzlaff and Eisenburg (2001) modified the 
task in a group of non-dysphoric, previously dysphoric, and chronically dysphoric 
individuals. Neutral/negative and neutral/positive homophones were presented, for 
example morning/mourning and suite/sweet. Individuals were required to write down 
the word they heard. However, the authors attempted to control the time in which they 
had to respond. There were two conditions: immediate and delayed. In immediate 
trials, individuals were instructed to write down the word they heard as quickly as 
possible (words were presented every three seconds). In delayed trials, individuals 
were given more time to write down the word they heard (words were presented every 
thirteen seconds). Wenzlaff and Eisenberg reported that non-dsyphoric individuals 
exhibited a positive interpretive bias in both immediate and delayed conditions (i.e. 
less likely to write down negative, and more likely to write down positive meanings 
of homophones). In contrast, chronically dysphoric individuals exhibited a negative 
interpretive bias in both immediate and delayed conditions (i.e. more likely to write 
down negative, and less likely to write down positive meanings of homophones). Of 
particular interest were the results demonstrated by previously dysphoric individuals. 
In the immediate condition, they responded in a similar manner to chronically 
dysphoric individuals, whereas in the delayed condition they responded in a similar 
manner to non-dysphoric individuals.  The authors inferred that previously depressed 
individuals do not lose the negative cognitions associated with their prior depressive 
episode; rather, they become better at controlling them.  This finding is supportive of 
cognitive theories of depression that state that negative processing biases are 
persistent, and automatically activated in those vulnerable to the disorder (i.e. those 
who have previously suffered from an episode).  
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Using the homophone spelling task, Mogg et al. (2006) also reported a 
negative bias in clinically depressed individuals. That is, clinically depressed 
individuals were more likely to write down the negatively emotional as opposed to the 
neutral spelling of homophones (e.g. die as opposed to dye). Importantly, this negative 
bias remained when individuals with co morbid depression and anxiety were removed 
from the analyses. The authors pointed out that this result was consistent with 
previous studies inferring negative information processing biases in depression. 
However, as they failed to obtain similar results using a different task (discussed 
below), they suggested that the results from the homophone spelling task could be due 
to a reporting bias.  
The homophone spelling task has been extensively criticised for its 
susceptibility to demand effects (MacLeod, 1990). Along with self report tasks, there 
is no way of determining the nature of obtained biases. In other words, there is no way 
of knowing whether an individual actually activates emotionally negative as opposed 
to neutral spellings first (interpretive bias), or whether they are simply more likely to 
write down emotionally negative as opposed to neutral spellings (response bias). In 
fact,  Mogg et al., (1994) found some support for the hypothesis that during the 
second half of the homophone spelling task, individuals become increasingly aware 
that they are hearing words with two meanings, and adopt response strategies in order 
to try and present themselves in a more favourable way, or in a way consistent with 
experimenter expectations.  The findings from Wenzlaff and Eisenberg (2001) also 
support this hypothesis (when given more time to respond, previously dysphoric 
individuals showed a conscious change in strategy). 
Text comprehension tasks. 
Another task used to assess interpretive biases in emotional disorders is the 
text comprehension task. In these tasks, participants are typically required to read an 
emotionally ambiguous sentence aloud, followed by a continuation sentence that is 
related to the neutral or negative meaning of the ambiguous sentence. The time taken 
to read the continuation sentence is used as the dependent measure. If, for example, 
participants are faster to read negative compared to neutral conclusions of ambiguous 
sentences, then negative interpretations are implied. This task was initially designed 
by anxiety researchers, and has been associated with anxiety-linked interpretive biases 
(e.g. MacLeod & Cohen, 1993).   
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In a slightly different variation to the original text comprehension task, 
Dearing and Gotlib (2009) tested cognitive theories of depression by examining 
whether negative interpretive biases were evident in those at risk for depression. They 
recruited daughters of depressed mothers (high risk group) and daughters of never 
depressed mothers (low risk group).  As cognitive models of depression postulate that 
negative schemas are triggered by negative moods or events, participants were first 
induced into a negative mood. In their text comprehension task, participants read 
ambiguous stories about themselves. For example:  
In PE, your teacher informs the class that she is starting a softball 
tournament. Your teacher picks four team captains and tells them to take turns 
picking teammates. You are certain that you will be picked _______.   
They were then shown a positive or negative probe word. For example, first (positive 
ending) or last (negative ending). Participants had to decide whether the probe word 
“fit” the story. Dearing and Gotlib found that daughters of depressed mothers were 
faster to respond to negative probes than daughters of never depressed mothers. No 
differences were found with positive probes. Thus, Dearing and Gotlib provided 
evidence in favour of a negative interpretive bias in those vulnerable to depression. 
Furthermore, supportive of cognitive theories of depression, this negative interpretive 
bias only emerged when negative schema were first activated (i.e. through negative 
mood induction).  
Along with using the homophone spelling task (previously discussed), Mogg 
et al. (2006) also used a modified version of the text comprehension task to test for 
depression-linked interpretive biases.  Participants were non-depressed and clinically-
depressed individuals. Participants were first presented with an ambiguous, depressive 
or non-depressive cue. They were then required to read an ambiguous sentence, 
followed by a continuation sentence. For example, participants would see either 
????? (ambiguous cue), death (depressive cue), or marriage (non-depressive cue). 
They were then required to read the sentence Carol cried throughout the service, 
followed by either funerals always made her cry (depressive meaning) or weddings 
always made her cry (non-depressive meaning). The authors predicted that clinically 
depressed participants would be faster to read continuations preceded by the 
ambiguous and depressive cue conditions, compared to the non-depressive cue 
condition. However, their results told a different story. The authors reported that 
clinically depressed and non-depressed participants were faster to read continuation 
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sentences preceded by ambiguous and non-depressive cue conditions, compared to the 
depressive-cue condition. Thus, no evidence in favour of a depression-linked 
interpretive bias was found. In fact, depressed individuals exhibited a non-depressed 
interpretive bias. However, it is possible that the text comprehension task used was 
not sensitive to depression-related interpretive biases because it relied heavily on 
statements about others (e.g., Carol cried). Depression has been linked with self-
referential biases (e.g. Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006; Smallwood, 2004). That is, 
depressed individuals are particularly sensitive to information about themselves. 
Perhaps changing the sentences to include “I” and “me” statements would have 
allowed depression-related biases to emerge (as in Dearing & Gotlib, 2009).  For 
example, I cried throughout the service. 
Semantic priming tasks. 
 In semantic priming paradigms, participants are presented with an ambiguous 
prime word or sentence. After a delay, they are then presented with a target word and 
/ or non-word.  The target word is either related to the prime (usually in a neutral or 
an emotionally negative / positive manner), or unrelated to the prime. Participants are 
typically required to (a) make a lexical decision judgement (decide whether the target 
is a word or non-word), (b) make a relatedness judgement (decide whether the prime 
and target are related or unrelated), or (c) read the target word aloud. Typically, 
participants are faster at responding to targets related to the prime than to targets 
unrelated to the prime. This is referred to as priming. Researchers studying emotional 
ambiguity are interested in individuals’ differences for priming of neutrally valenced 
words versus priming of negatively valenced words. Anxiety-linked interpretive 
biases have been extensively reported in semantic priming tasks (e.g. Calvo & 
Castillo, 1997; Calvo, Eysenck, & Castillo, 1997; MacLeod, 1990; Richards & 
French, 1992), but studies in depression remain rare.     
Lawson and MacLeod (1999) were the first to test for a depression-linked 
interpretive bias using a semantic priming task. As cognitive theories of depression 
posit that negative schema only become active after a negative event or mood state, 
participants were low and high in depressive symptoms, but also induced into a 
positive or dysphoric mood. Participants were required to read aloud ambiguous 
sentences (e.g. the doctor examined little Emma’s growth). They then had to read a 
target word aloud that was either related to the neutral interpretation (e.g. height), or 
the negative interpretation (e.g. tumour). Response latencies were measured, and used 
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as the dependent variable. Lawson and MacLeod reported no effects with their 
dysphoric and positive mood induction. However, they did report that those high in 
depressive symptoms exhibited priming for neutral interpretations of ambiguous 
sentences, whereas those in low in depressive symptoms exhibited priming for 
negative interpretations of ambiguous sentences. This, of course, was unexpected, and 
argued against their hypothesis.  
There is, however, an alternative explanation for Lawson and MacLeod’s 
(1999) counterintuitive findings. The authors selected individuals who scored in the 
top and bottom third of a depression scale, but in the middle third of an anxiety scale. 
Although at face value, this appears to be a reasonable way to control for anxiety, as 
discussed by Beuke et al. (2003) it comes with major concerns. The depression and 
anxiety scales administered both share properties of general negative affect (see Clark 
& Watson, 1991). The anxiety scale also shares properties associated with depression 
(Bieling, Antony, & Swinson 1998).  Thus, the mood of an individual scoring in the 
middle range on their anxiety scale could actually take two different forms.  Firstly: 
low negative affect + low depression + high anxiety. Secondly: high negative affect + 
high depression + low anxiety.  So, in selecting two groups that scored similarly on 
their anxiety scale, Lawson and MacLeod may have constructed two groups that 
ironically differed in levels of pure anxiety. The fact that their two groups might have 
consisted of those high in depression and low in pure anxiety and low in depression 
and high in pure anxiety, actually provides a reasonable explanation of their results: 
the interpretive biases observed could have been driven by anxiety. Thus, Lawson and 
MacLeod’s (1999, pp. 472) interpretation, specifically that they provided “rather 
strong evidence for quite the reverse pattern of depression-linked interpretive bias” is 
tentative at best.   
Blink-reflex tasks. 
In a later study Lawson et al. (2002) further assessed interpretive biases in 
those low and high in depression using a more sensitive task. Specifically, the blink 
reflex was used as their dependent measure (i.e. participants were startled with white 
noise, and the magnitude of their blink reflex was recorded). Large blink reflexes are 
associated with negatively valenced information, and small blink reflexes with 
neutrally valenced information. If an ambiguous stimulus is presented and associated 
with a large blink reflex, one can assume the negative as opposed to neutral 
interpretation was selected. Participants low and high in depressive symptoms heard 
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neutral (e.g. dress), negative (e.g. stress) and ambiguous (e.g. an acoustic blend of 
dress & stress, in which the distinguishing phoneme was adjusted e.g. *ress) words. 
They were required to imagine a situation evoked by the word, and were then startled 
with white noise after which their blink reflex was measured. Lawson et al. found that 
blink reflexes for ambiguous words in those high in depressive symptoms, were larger 
when compared to neutral words, but no different when compared to negative words.  
The opposite was found for those low in depressive symptoms. Blink reflexes were 
smaller when compared to negative words, but no different when compared to neutral 
words. Results combined suggested that those high in depressive symptoms 
interpreted ambiguous stimuli in a negative manner, and those low in depressive 
symptoms in a neutral manner. Lawson et al. were the first to show a depression-
linked interpretive bias, using a methodology that did not rely on self report or 
homophone spelling tasks. Their results can also be uniquely attributed to depression, 
as the authors adequately controlled for anxiety. Specifically, anxiety was used as a 
covariate in all analyses. The authors also performed an additional statistical control 
in which they compared high and low anxious individuals using depression as a 
covariate. Under these conditions, no group effects were observed.  
Time-Course of Interpretive Biases 
 An important factor to consider in tasks that assess interpretive biases through 
priming is the actual mechanism that gives rise to priming. Priming can be a result of 
initial automatic activation (e.g. through spreading of activation among related 
constructs; automatic processing), or as a result of controlled processes (e.g. 
participants generate a set of related constructs in anticipation of the target; controlled 
processing). The most common way to distinguish between automatic and controlled 
processing is to manipulate the time between the onset of the prime and the onset of 
the target. This is referred to as stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). If priming effects 
are observed at short SOAs (typically less than 500ms), priming is attributed to 
automatic processes; however, if priming effects are observed at long SOAs (typically 
greater than 700ms), priming is attributed to controlled processes. Notably, there is 
debate in the word recognition literature in regard to the specific time that 
differentiates automatic from controlled processes (see Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). 
For this reason, the phrases early stages of processing (inclusive of automatic 
processes) versus late stages of processing (inclusive of controlled processes) will 
now be used, as they are more encompassing, and not tied to a specific theory.   
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The time course of priming in non-emotional ambiguity has been extensively 
studied (e.g Simpson, 1984; Simpson & Burgess, 1985; Simpson & Kang, 1994; 
Simpson & Krueger, 1991; Swinney, 1979). It appears that in the early stages of 
processing (typically less than 500ms) both meanings of an ambiguous word are 
primed, reflecting initial activation of all possible meanings. However at the later 
stages of processing (typically greater than 700ms) one is primed, while the other is 
inhibited. Context plays a vital role in disambiguating ambiguous information (see 
Gaskell & Marslen-Wilson, 2001). Nevertheless, there is still debate in the literature 
about whether context effects occur before (early) word identification or after (late). 
This being said, Lucas (1999) carried out a meta-analysis in which the early effects of 
context on lexical access were examined. Results suggested that contextually 
appropriate meanings are at least activated to a greater extent than contextually 
inappropriate meanings at early processing stages.    
Using high- and low-trait anxious individuals, Richards and French (1992) 
were the first to examine the time course of interpretive biases in emotional 
ambiguity. They used a semantic priming paradigm with a lexical decision task.  
Emotional homographs were visually presented as primes (e.g. arms). After delays of 
500ms, 750ms or 1200ms, target words or non-words were presented. Target words 
were either related to the non-threatening meaning of the prime (e.g. legs), related to 
the threatening meaning of the prime (e.g. weapons) or unrelated to the prime. At the 
500ms SOA, both high- and low-trait anxious individuals primed both threat and non-
threat meanings. At the 700ms SOA, high-trait anxious individuals primed threat but 
not non-threat meanings, whereas no effects were observed with low- trait anxious 
individuals. At the 1200ms SOA, high-trait anxious individuals primed threat 
meanings and inhibited non-threat meanings, with the reverse pattern evident for low-
trait anxious individuals. The results of Richards and French suggest that during the 
early stages of processing, threat and non-threat meanings are equally available to 
high- and low-trait anxious individuals. However, during the later stages of 
processing, high-trait anxious individuals allocate more resources to threatening 
meanings and low-trait anxious individuals allocate more resources to non-threat 
meanings.  Using a text comprehension task, Calvo and collegues (Calvo & Castillo, 
1997; Calvo, et al.,1997) also found that anxiety-linked interpretive biases were a 
result of late as opposed to early processes. Results from depression studies, however, 
tell a different story.  
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Bisson and Sears (2007) examined the time course of interpretive biases in 
depression. To assess interpretive bias, they used a cross-modal semantic priming 
task. Specifically, participants heard an ambiguous sentence, saw a target word or 
non-word, and made a lexical decision judgement. The target word was either related 
or unrelated to the ambiguous prime sentence. If related, it was related in a neutral, 
negative or positive manner.  For example, participants would hear Joan was stunned 
by her final exam results, and see, grades (neutral related), distress (negative related) 
or success (positively related). In order to differentiate between early and late 
processes, the time between the offset of the prime sentence and the onset of the target 
was manipulated. This is referred to as inter stimulus interval (ISI). They found that 
those high and low in depression were equally likely to prime positive and negative 
interpretations of ambiguous sentences. Furthermore, this effect remained at the 0ms 
ISI (intended to tap into early processes) and the 1000ms and 2000ms ISIs (intended 
to tap into late processes). Bisson and Sears suggested that negative schema might 
have to be activated in those high in depression before a negative interpretive bias 
became apparent, as asserted by cognitive theories on the disorder. In order to explore 
this possibility they carried out a further experiment in which a negative mood was 
induced in both their low and high depression groups. Although the negative mood 
induction procedure appeared to be effective, results were similar to those of their 
previous experiments.  
Bisson and Sears (2007) acknowledged that the lack of interpretative bias 
observed with their high-depressed group was consistent with Lawson and MacLeod’s 
(1999) findings, and combined cast doubt on the robustness of the typically 
hypothesized effect (i.e. that depression is associated with a negative interpretive 
bias).  However, as with Lawson and MacLeod (1999), there are some serious 
concerns with their results. Bisson and Sears made no mention of controlling for 
anxiety, and in fact, did not even administer an anxiety scale to their participants. 
Additionally, Bisson and Sears offered no explanation of the lack of priming 
differences observed during the early versus later stages of processing. For example, 
one would at least expect that individuals low in depression and induced into a 
positive mood would be more inclined to exhibit a positive bias at the later stages of 
processing (e.g. see Hirsch & Mathews, 1997). One explanation is that their task was 
not sensitive enough to pick up on priming differences during the early versus later 
stages of processing. Consider two of their ambiguous prime sentences: (a) Jason’s 
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classmates laughed as he made his presentation (b) Carol cried throughout the 
service. In each case, there is a target word that turns the sentence into an ambiguous 
statement. In the first sentence, laughed could refer to cheering or mocking. In the 
second sentence service could refer to marriage or funeral. Importantly, these words 
are presented at different points within the sentences. Nonetheless, target words were 
presented at specific ISI’s (after the end of the sentence) with the expectation that they 
would differentially tap into the early versus later stages of processing. However, the 
type of processing tapped into will have depended on when the ambiguity within the 
sentence was presented.  In fact, by varying the placement of target words in the 
ambiguous statements, the ISIs reported by Bisson and Sears are much longer than 
reported and therefore essentially meaningless. The only possible interpretation of 
their data is that, given sufficient time, individuals both high and low in depression 
can activate both positive and negative interpretations of ambiguous sentences.  
 In a follow up study, Sears et al. (2010) assessed interpretive biases in 
dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals, using a relatedness judgement task. A 
relatedness judgement was chosen as they suggested that lexical decision tasks are 
perhaps not sensitive enough to detect interpretive biases in depression (because 
lexical decision responses are not necessarily related to participants’ interpretation of 
ambiguity). Individuals listened to ambiguous prime sentences that were self referent 
in nature. For example my boyfriend said that I am unlike his past girlfriends.  They 
then saw visually related and unrelated targets, and were required to make a yes or no 
response (yes – related; no – unrelated). Visual targets were either related to the 
negative (e.g. jealous), positive (e.g. attractive), or neutral (e.g. relationship) 
interpretation of the prime sentence.  Like their previous study, Sears et al. 
manipulated the ISI (0ms or 1000ms). However in this study the manipulation was 
within subjects, with the reasoning that it would control for anticipatory responses. 
Sears et al. predicted that dysphoric individuals would be faster to respond to negative 
than to positive or neutral targets, thus implying they would be more likely to 
immediately impose negative as opposed to positive or neutral meanings on 
ambiguous sentences.  
Sears et al’s (2010) hypothesis was not supported. However, they did find 
significant effects in their accuracy data.  According to Signal Detection Theory 
(MacMillan & Creelman, 2005), responses in tasks that require a relatedness 
judgement can be coded in four ways: as a hit (responding related to a related target), 
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miss (responding unrelated to a related target), false alarm (responding related to an 
unrelated target), or correct rejection (responding unrelated to an unrelated target). 
The authors found no differences in false alarm or correct rejection rates between 
dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals. They did, however, report that dysphoric 
individuals were less likely to miss negative targets and more likely to miss positive 
targets than non-dysphoric individuals. Sears et al. thus inferred that dysphoric 
individuals were more likely to ‘immediately’ impose negative as opposed to positive 
interpretations on the ambiguous sentences.  
 There are, however, several concerns with Sears et al.’s (2010) study.  Firstly, 
their results were not fully analyzed according to Signal Detection Theory.  Typically 
in signal detection tasks, hit and false alarm rates are transformed into measures of 
sensitivity and criterion (MacMillan & Creelman, 2005). Sensitivity (d’) can produce 
a measure of an individual’s ability to discriminate between related and unrelated 
prime-target pairs, and criterion (c) can measure whether individuals are more likely 
to respond “related” or “unrelated” when they are uncertain about prime-target pairs.  
Thus, Sears et al. should have obtained negative, positive and neutral sensitivity 
values as opposed to just looking at miss rates, as these would have provided 
measures of interpretive bias independent of response bias. Secondly, as with their 
previous study, Sears et al. manipulated ISI with prime sentences which in itself 
causes an array of issues (previously discussed). Furthermore, they reported no 
interactions involving ISI in their accuracy data, thus their miss rates were averaged 
across 0ms and 1000ms conditions. Sears et al. suggest that their task was assessing 
‘immediate’ interpretations of ambiguous sentences (i.e. the early stages of 
processing); however, given the constraints of their task any claims about the time 
course of the interpretive biases obtained are unfounded. Thirdly, as with their 
previous study, Sears et al. failed to assess individuals’ anxiety levels, let alone 
attempt to control for them. For this reason, it cannot be concluded that the negative 
interpretive biases observed were linked with dysphoria. Despite these concerns, 
Sears et al’s findings were still informative to the field by verifying the use of 
relatedness judgement tasks in the assessment of depression-linked interpretive biases.  
Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation (CBM-I) 
As illustrated, although research on anxiety-linked interpretive biases is 
plentiful, studies on depression-linked interpretive biases are lagging behind.  An 
innovative area in the anxiety field involves inducing interpretive biases in healthy 
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individuals in an experimentally controlled manner.  Why? Because in order to 
understand the cognitive mechanisms involved in the development and maintenance 
of anxiety-linked interpretive biases, one must first understand the processes involved 
in healthy individuals. Of course, the same principle applies to depression-linked 
interpretive biases. Over a series of four experiments Grey and Mathews (2000) 
investigated whether they could experimentally manipulate the way in which healthy 
individuals’ interpreted ambiguous information through training. Training, now 
commonly known as Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation (CBM-I), is 
defined as “controlled exposure to circumstances that lead to a systematic change” 
(Grey & Mathews, 2000, pp. 1145). Specifically, Grey and Mathews wanted to see 
whether forcing participants to resolve ambiguous information in either a threatening 
or non-threatening manner would subsequently influence the way in which they 
resolved ambiguous information at the later stages of processing.  
Grey and Mathews’ (2000) first experiment consisted of two phases: a training 
phase and a test phase. Half of participants were trained to interpret ambiguous words 
in a non-threatening way, and half in a threatening way. Training involved solving 
related word fragments of ambiguous words. For example, the homograph beat would 
be shown on the computer screen. After a 750ms SOA (tapping into the later stages of 
processing) this was followed by either r_yt_m (rhythm; non-threat condition) or 
p_li_e (police; threat condition). Participants were required to generate the missing 
letters. In the test phase, the training contingency previously used was eliminated. 
Every participant was presented with threat and non-threat word fragment solutions to 
old and new homographs. Results showed that training with non-threat meanings only 
produced faster reaction times to non-threat fragments of old homographs. In contrast, 
training with threat meanings produced faster reaction times to threat fragments for 
both old and new homographs. In other words, when enough time was given for 
controlled processes to emerge, threat training produced a threat-induced interpretive 
bias (i.e. the training generalised to new homographs), but the same was not true of 
non-threat training (i.e. the training did not generalise to new homographs).  The later 
finding is perhaps not surprising as “non-threat” is a less salient and cohesive 
emotional category than “threat”. 
Grey and Mathews (2000) suggested that in order to induce interpretive biases, 
it is possible that training needs to involve the active generation of valenced 
meanings. That is, it might require individuals to actively select one meaning over 
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another (active training). In order to test this hypothesis, they carried out a further 
experiment. This time their training phase required participants to simply verify the 
association between two valenced words (passive training). They were first shown an 
associate of a homograph, for example, water (non-threat condition) or break (threat 
condition). They were then shown the homograph itself, in this case, drop. They were 
required to make a relatedness judgement (decide whether the two words were related 
or unrelated). Unlike the training phase in their previous experiment, the associate of 
the homograph was shown first in the hope that participants would be less likely to 
access alternative meanings of the homograph itself (i.e. active generation of one 
interpretation over another was not required). The test phase consisted of a lexical 
decision task (from Richards & French, 1992), with an SOA of 750ms (tapping into 
the later stages of processing). Results showed that participants who trained with 
threat meanings were faster to respond to old and new threat targets than old and new 
non-threat targets. This time the reverse effect was also evident for those who trained 
with non-threat meanings. These findings suggested that in order to induce an 
interpretive bias at the later stages of processing, generation of appropriately valenced 
words was not required. 
Grey and Mathews (2000) were the first to show that negative interpretive 
biases could be induced in healthy individuals by repeated exposure to emotionally 
valenced meanings of ambiguous words. In other words, they showed that interpretive 
biases were not invariant, and could be modified by means other than altering mood 
state. Using CBM-I, negative interpretive biases have also been trained in recognition 
memory tasks with passages of ambiguous text (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000a; 
Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2010). These findings have been extended to show 
that induced interpretive biases are durable across delays, ranging from 20 minutes to 
24 hours (Yiend, Mackintosh & Mathews, 2005) and are able to withstand changes in 
environmental contexts, for example transferring to different rooms, with different 
experimenters, and having material presented in different sensory modalities 
(Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006).  Additionally, in the most 
recent CBM-I study, Hoppitt, Matthews, Yiend, and Mackintosh (2010a) have shown 
that individuals need not train with ambiguous information in order to modify 
subsequent interpretation. Specifically, in one of their passive threat training 
conditions, participants saw negatively valent unambiguous words (e.g. cancer), and 
then completed threatening unambiguous word fragments (e.g. tumour). This method 
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of training still led to training-congruent biases at the later stages of processing in a 
subsequent interpretation task.  
Current Study 
As previously mentioned, CBM-I originated from the anxiety field. In fact, no 
studies to date have assessed whether cognitive bias modification influences 
interpretation differently according to vulnerability to depression. In addition, 
although induced interpretive biases in CBM-I tasks have been detected at the later 
stages of processing (when enough time is given for controlled processes to emerge), 
it is unknown as to whether they are identifiable at the early stages of processing (as a 
result of automatic activation of related concepts). Thus, the current study aims to 
answer two questions. Firstly, do induced negative interpretive biases differ for those 
lower and higher in depressive symptoms? And secondly, are induced interpretive 
biases a result of early or later processes? Cognitive theories of depression posit that 
after negative schemas become active, those vulnerable to the disorder automatically 
active negative interpretations of ambiguous information. For this reason, compared 
to those scoring lower, those scoring higher on a depression scale might be uniquely 
receptive to negative context training during the early stages of processing.  In order 
to address these questions a novel methodology was required.    
A cross-modal priming paradigm with a relatedness judgement was used. 
Specifically, participants heard a word, then saw a word, and had to decide whether 
the auditory-visual word-pair was related or unrelated. A cross-modal semantic 
priming paradigm was chosen because it has notable advantages when it comes to 
exerting experimental control. Prime words were chosen over prime sentences, 
because it was essential that time intervals were rigidly manipulated in order to 
differentiate between early and late processes (i.e. see discussion on Bisson & Sears, 
2007 and Sears et al. 2010). As the majority of prime words in the current study were 
one syllable, they did not drastically vary in spoken duration, allowing for the 
manipulation of SOA (as in Grey & Mathews, 2000 and Richard & French, 1992). A 
relatedness judgement was chosen over a lexical decision task for two reasons. Firstly, 
as pointed out by Sears et al. (2010), in lexical decision tasks participants simply have 
to decide whether what they see is a word or a non-word. This decision is not directly 
related to the participant’s interpretation of ambiguity. In fact, participants could 
ignore the ambiguous prime word, and still successfully complete the task. In 
relatedness judgements, the participant has to decide whether the prime and target are 
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related, or unrelated. This decision is more likely to be linked to the interpretation of 
ambiguity, and further encourages them to pay attention to the prime. Secondly, 
relatedness judgements allow for signal detection analysis. Signal detection analysis 
will be used to determine whether depression or context training affect sensitivity to 
emotionally valenced information independent of response biases.  
The two experiments in the current study both consisted of two phases, a 
context training phase and an interpretive phase. There were two crucial differences 
between each phase. Firstly, every prime heard in the context training phase had one 
meaning (unambiguous), whereas every prime heard in the interpretive phase had two 
meanings (ambiguous). Secondly, the context training phase was manipulated 
between-subjects, and consisted of word pairs related in only one valence, neutral or 
negative. However, the interpretive phase was manipulated within-subjects, and 
consisted of ambiguous primes followed by targets of both neutral and negative 
valence. Like previous CBM-I studies (e.g. Grey & Mathews, 2000; Wilson, 
MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006), Experiment 1 used a long SOA (800ms), in 
order to tap into the late stages of processing. If participants use the context training 
as a cue to help guide the interpretation of ambiguous information in a controlled 
way, then those in negative context training will be faster and more accurate than 
those in the neutral context training to judge targets that are related to the negative 
interpretation of the ambiguous homophone (consistent with previous CBM-I studies 
e.g. Grey & Mathews, 2000; Wilson et al., 2006).  Furthermore, if those vulnerable to 
depression are particularly sensitive at picking up on negative contextual cues and 
using them in a controlled way, then this effect will be larger for those higher in 
depressive symptoms. Experiment 2 used a short SOA (400ms), in order to tap into 
the early stages of processing. If context training leads to the automatic activation of 
related concepts, then those in negative context training will be faster and more 
accurate than those in neutral context training to judge targets that are related to the 
negative interpretation of the ambiguous homophone. Furthermore, if those 
vulnerable to depression are particularly sensitive to negative contextual cues in the 
early stages of processing (as predicted by cognitive theories on depression), then this 
effect will be larger for those higher in depressive symptoms.   
Experiment 1 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to determine whether repeated access to 
valenced unambiguous word-pairs would influence the subsequent interpretation of 
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emotional homophones. There were two phases; a context training phase and an 
interpretive phase. During the context training phase, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two context training conditions; neutral or negative. Those in 
neutral context training heard unambiguous neutral primes (e.g. book) followed by 
related or unrelated visual targets (e.g. read or boat respectively) and those in 
negative context training heard unambiguous negative primes (e.g. sick) followed by 
related or unrelated visual targets (e.g. vomit or wreck respectively). Participants made 
a relatedness judgement. During the interpretive phase, those in both neutral and 
negative context training heard homophone primes with both emotionally neutral and 
negative meanings (e.g. sleigh/slay). Of the related targets they saw, half were to the 
neutral interpretation (e.g. sleigh-snow) and half to the negative interpretation (e.g. 
slay-murder). Unrelated targets were similarly negative or neutral in valence. Again, 
participants were required to make a relatedness judgement. An SOA of 800ms was 
used in order to allow enough time for controlled processes to emerge (tapping into 
the later stages of processing).  
If participants use context training as a cue to help guide the interpretation of 
ambiguous information, then those in negative context training will be faster and 
more accurate than those in neutral context training at saying ‘related’ to homophone-
target pairs that are resolved in a negative as opposed to neutral manner (reflected in a 
word-pair valence x context training interaction).  Furthermore, if those vulnerable to 
depression are particularly sensitive to negative contextual cues, then this effect will 
be greater for those scoring high in depression (reflected in a word-pair valence x 
context training x depression interaction). Alternatively, if vulnerability to depression 
is reflected in a bias towards negative interpretation in general, then compared to 
those low in depression, those high in depression should be faster and more accurate 
to negatively valenced targets overall, regardless context training (reflected in a word-
pair valence x depression interaction).   
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 32 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, who received 
course credit for their inclusion in the experiment. Participants were 4 men, and 28 
women, with a mean age of 19 (range 18-20) and 20 (range 17-43) respectively.  
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Participants were English speaking, and had no reported hearing loss or history of 
depression.  
Stimuli 
Questionnaires. 
The Zung Self Rated Depression Scale (SDS; see Appendix A) was used to 
assess participants’ current depressive symptoms (Zung, 1965). There are 20 
questions in total, 10 questions are worded towards increasing depressive levels, and 
10 towards decreasing depressive levels. For example, I feel down-hearted and blue 
and I feel that I am useful and needed. Participants answer on a 4-point Likert scale 
(“a little of the time”, “some of the time”, “a good part of the time”, or “most of the 
time”). Possible scores range from 20-80. A score of less than 50 is considered to be 
within the normal range. Scores between 50-59 are reflective of minimal to mild 
depression, scores between 60-69 of moderate to severe depression, and scores above 
70 of severe depression.     
The Zung Self Rated Anxiety Scale (SAS; see Appendix A) was used to assess 
participants’ current anxiety symptoms (Zung, 1971). There are 20 questions in total, 
15 questions are worded towards increasing anxiety levels, and 5 questions towards 
decreasing anxiety levels. For example, I feel afraid for no reason at all and I can 
breathe in and out easily. Participants answer on a 4-point Likert scale (“a little of the 
time”, “some of the time”, “a good part of the time”, or “most of the time”). Possible 
scores range from 20-80. Scores between 20-44 are considered to be within the 
normal range. Scores between 45-59 are reflective of mild to moderate anxiety, scores 
between 60-74 of severe anxiety, and scores between 75-80 of extreme anxiety.  
The Zung scales correlate well with the Hamilton depression and anxiety 
scales (depression, r = .76, Biggs, Wylie, & Ziegler, 1978; anxiety, r = .75, Zung, 
1971), and have good reliability (split-half r = .73, Zung, 1972; Chronbach’s 
alpha = .79, Knight, Waal-Manning, & Spears, 1983). 
 Prime-target pairs in context training. 
Sixty-four unambiguous primes (32 with a neutral meaning, 32 with a negative 
meaning) were taken from the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley 
& Lang, 1999). Each ANEW word has a valence rating between one and nine 
(negative – positive). Neutral primes were selected if they had a valence rating 
between five and six, and negative primes were selected if they had a valence rating 
between one and four. An independent t-test confirmed that the neutral primes 
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(M=5.36, SD=1.46) were rated significantly more positive than the negative primes 
(M=2.63, SD=1.62), t(62) = 21.76, p < .001, d = 1.685.  
Sixty-four related targets were selected for the unambiguous primes (32 with a 
neutral meaning, 32 with a negative meaning). The majority were taken from the 
University of South Florida Free Association Norms (USFFAN; Nelson, McEvoy & 
Schreiber, 1998). Primes were searched, and the most frequent associate was chosen, 
as long as it was of similar valence to the prime. If the USFFAN could not provide an 
associate, primes were presented to six independent judges, who were asked to 
produce three associates. The most common associate was then selected, as long as it 
was of similar valence to the prime. Typically, unrelated targets are created by 
randomly re-pairing related primes and targets (e.g. Simpson & Burgess, 1985). 
However, this approach was not suitable for the current study, given that many prime-
target pairs would have still been related. For example, the prime burn could relate 
not only to fire, but to wreck, anger and victim. For this reason, each prime was 
intentionally paired with an unrelated target. All targets were then matched to entires 
in the ANEW database in order to obtain valence ratings, but only 19 were found (8 
neutral targets, and 11 negative targets). Nonetheless, a paired sample t-test confirmed 
that of those, the neutral targets (M=6.15, SD=0.90) were rated significantly more 
positively than the negative targets (M=2.87, SD=0.66), t(17) = 9.15, p < .001, d = 
3.644.  Negative and neutral targets were matched for word length and frequency 
(Kucera & Francis, 1967). For a full list of context prime-target pairs see Appendix B. 
 Homophones for interpretation. 
A pool of emotionally-ambiguous homophones were obtained from various 
sources (Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Mathews et al., 1989; Nygaard, & Lunders, 
2002). Forty-seven homophones, each with both a relatively neutral meaning and a 
relatively negative meaning, were selected as potential primes. Two questionnaires 
were then produced. Each questionnaire presented only one alternative spelling of the 
homophone (e.g. questionnaire 1 = sleigh, questionnaire 2 = slay). Approximately half 
of the homophones were spelled in their neutral form, and approximately half in their 
negative form. Positive words were also included as fillers (sweet, hug, joy, love and 
peace).  
The two questionnaires were administered to a group of pre-test participants 
(n=16), who rated the words for valence on a 5-point Likert scale (1= negative, 2= 
more negative than neutral, 3= neutral, 4= more positive than neutral, 5= positive).  
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Thirty-two homophones were selected based upon their mean rating in both the 
neutral and negative form (neutral range = 2.63 – 3.63; negative range = 1.00 – 2.88), 
and the difference between their mean rating in the neutral and negative form. 
Homophones were excluded if the ‘neutral’ meaning was rated as too positive (e.g. 
berry / bury), too negative (e.g. bald / bawled), or if participants indicated they did 
not understand the meaning of the word (e.g. lye / lie). An independent t-test 
confirmed that of the 32 homographs selected, the valence ratings for the neutral 
spellings (M=3.11, SD=.29) were significantly higher than the valence ratings for the 
negative spellings (M=1.66, SD=.42), t(62)=16.20, p<.001, d = 3.452. For a full list of 
homophones and their mean ratings see Appendices C and D.  
Homophone prime-target pairs for interpretation. 
There were 32 homophone primes, but they were treated as 64 primes, 32 
neutral in meaning, and 32 negative in meaning. The majority of targets were taken 
from the USFFAN (Nelson et al., 1998). Both spellings of each homophone prime 
were searched, and the most frequent associate was chosen, as long as it was 
congruent in valence to the homophone prime of interest (e.g. sleigh - snow = both 
neutral in meaning; slay - kill = both negative in meaning). If the USFFAN could not 
provide an associate, homophone primes were presented to six independent judges, 
who were asked to produce three associates. The most common associate was then 
selected, as long as it was congruent in valence to the homophone prime of interest. 
Each prime was intentionally paired with an appropriate unrelated target. Targets 
were then searched in the ANEW database in order to obtain valence ratings, but only 
26 were found (12 neutral targets, and 14 negative targets). Nonetheless, an 
independent samples t-test confirmed that, of those, the neutral targets were rated 
significantly more positively (M=6.41, SD= 1.14) than the negative targets (M=2.86, 
SD=.99), t(24) = 8.43, p < .001, d = 3.114. Negative and neutral targets were matched 
for word length and frequency. For a full list of homophone prime-target pairs see 
Appendix E. 
Recordings. 
Prior to the experiment, the context and homophone primes were digitally 
recorded at a sound studio by a New Zealand voice actress, whose native language 
was English. Homophone primes were recorded twice – once with the actress reading 
the neutral spelling (e.g. sleigh) and once with her reading the negative spelling (e.g. 
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slay)2. A list of words was presented to the actress in random order, so that she did 
not read the two versions of the homophone one after the other. She was instructed to 
speak with as little emotion as possible, in order to portray a neutral tone. The 
recordings were made with a Neumann U87 microphone, in one channel (mono) at 24 
bits and 44100kz. The sound editing software Audacity (version 1.2.6) was used to 
duplicate the mono recordings to make stereo files. It was also used to convert files to 
16 bits, and equate them for peak amplitude. The mean duration of a homophone 
prime was 677ms, with a standard deviation of 93ms.   
Procedure  
After written consent was obtained, groups of participants (no greater than six) 
were seated at computer booths in a large testing room. Participants first completed 
the cross-modal priming task, and then filled out the depression and anxiety 
questionnaires. The cross-modal priming task consisted of two phases; context 
training (always the first block of trials), and interpretation (always the second block 
of trials). In both phases, participants heard a prime through stereo headphones, and 
then saw a related or unrelated target on the computer screen.  For example, in the 
interpretive phase, participants would have heard sleigh / slay, and then seen either 
snow (neutral related), kill (negative related), class (neutral unrelated), or deprived 
(negative unrelated). Participants were required to make a relatedness judgement by 
pressing the 1 (related) or 2 (unrelated) key with the index or middle finger of their 
right hand.  
The valence of the context training phase was manipulated between 
participants – half of participants were assigned to neutral context training (64 neutral 
prime-target pairs; 32 related, 32 unrelated), and half to negative context training (64 
negative prime-target pairs; 32 related, 32 unrelated). The interpretive phase was 
manipulated within subjects - every participant was presented with 64 homophone 
prime-target pairs, 32 related (16 neutral, 16 negative) and 32 unrelated (16 neutral, 
16 negative). The valence of the related and unrelated homograph prime-target pairs 
was counterbalanced between participants. For example, if participant 1 heard and 
saw sleigh – snow (neutral related) and slay – deprived (negative unrelated), 
participant 2 would hear and see slay – kill (negative related) and sleigh – class 
                                               
2 The experimenter listened to each spelling of the homophone carefully, to ensure the pronunciation 
was the same. Once this was established, one version was chosen (typically that with the best sound 
quality). 
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(neutral unrelated).  Thus each participant heard each homophone twice, but only one 
with a related target (either neutral or negative). Across participants, each homophone 
was presented equally often with each type of target. 
The time between the onset of the prime, and the onset of the target was 
800ms. Targets were presented in black lower-case letters on a white background for 
250ms, and there was a response-stimulus interval (RSI) of 1500ms. Participants 
responded to 128 trials which took no longer than 10 minutes to complete. Once 
everyone had finished, the depression and anxiety questionnaires were handed out. 
These took no longer than 10 minutes to complete. Participants were then verbally 
debriefed and given an informational handout to take home.  
Results and Discussion 
All participants met the criteria for sensitivity to distinguish between related 
and unrelated word-pairs. That is, they obtained sensitivity values of 1.0 or higher for 
both neutral and negative homophone word-pairs. Depression and anxiety scores are 
presented in Table 1. In order to include depression as a between subjects variable, a 
median split was performed on the SDS. Those scoring between 22 and 32 were 
classified as “lower depression” and those between 33 and 58 as “higher depression”.   
Note that no one scored in the range seen in those with major depression, and so the 
groups reflect variability in depressive symptoms within the normal range. As 
consistent with previous literature, depression and anxiety scales were highly 
correlated r(30) = .68, p = <.001. Anxiety was used as a covariate in all analyses. 
However, in order to ensure potential depression effects were solely attributable to the 
disorder, depression analyses were repeated with anxiety as a between-subjects factor 
and depression as a covariate. Therefore a median split was also performed on the 
SAS. Those scoring between 25 and 31 were classified as “lower anxiety” and those 
between 32 and 43 as “higher anxiety”.   
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Table 1.  
Depression and Anxiety Scores for Individuals in Experiment 1(800ms SOA).  
 
Note. SDS, Zung Self-Rated Depression Scale; SAS, Zung Self-Rated Anxiety Scale.  
* Group numbers are unequal as individuals were randomly assigned to context 
training conditions before they completed the mood questionnaires.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although participants completed a context training block and an interpretation 
block, only performance on the latter was analysed, as it was the critical block of 
interest. The cross-modal relatedness task was essentially a signal detection task; 
therefore, accuracy was transformed into measures of sensitivity (d’; a measure of 
participant’s ability to discriminate between related and unrelated word pairs) and 
criterion (c; a measure of participant’s bias to respond “related” or “unrelated” under 
conditions of uncertainty).  Sensitivity (d’) was calculated based on the Hit Rate 
(response of “related” to a related word pair) and the False Alarm Rate (response of 
“related” to an unrelated word pair) according to the formula: 
d’ = z(Hit Rate) – z (False Alarm Rate) 
with the correction for rates of 0 and 1 to .025 and .975 respectively (MacMillan & 
Creelman, 2005). The criterion measure (c) was calculated as: 
c = -0.5(z(Hit Rate) + z(False Alarm Rate). 
Positive values of c reflect a conservative criterion; that is, a bias to report word pairs 
as unrelated. Negative values of c reflect a lax criterion; that is, a bias to report word 
pairs as related. All response time analyses were based on median response times to 
concordant responses; that is, responses of “related” to related word pairs. 
Accuracy 
Sensitivity (d’) and criterion (c) values were separately analysed in a 2 (word-
pair valence: neutral, negative) x 2 (context training: neutral, negative) x 2 
  Neutral Context Training  Negative Context Training 
 * 
Lower SDS 
N = 6 
Higher SDS 
N = 10  
Lower SDS 
N = 9 
Higher SDS 
N = 7 
 M(SD) M(SD)  M(SD) M(SD) 
SDS 29.00(2.76) 40.30(5.27)  28.56(2.13) 38.71(3.50) 
SAS 30.17(6.70) 34.70(5.58)  29.22(4.21) 35.57(2.37) 
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(depression: lower, higher) mixed model ANOVA, with word-pair valence as a 
within-subject variable and context training and depression as between-subject 
variable (see Table 2). Anxiety was used as a covariate. 
 
Table 2.  
Accuracy of Homophone Prime-Target Pairs for Individuals in Experiment 1 (800ms 
SOA). 
 * 
Neutral Context Training Negative Context Training 
Lower SDS 
N=6 
Higher SDS 
N=10 
Lower SDS 
N=9 
Higher SDS 
N=7 
 M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
Neutral Homophones     
Hit / 16 7.00(1.26) 7.20(1.62) 6.33(1.22) 6.14(2.54) 
False Alarm / 16 0.75(0.27) 1.05(0.83) 1.22(0.75) 0.79(0.57) 
d' 1.55(0.23) 1.46(0.41) 1.27(0.48) 1.41(0.58) 
c 0.91(0.14) 0.82(0.24) 0.86(0.18) 0.99(0.26) 
Negative Homophones     
Hit / 16 11.00(1.79) 10.50(2.17) 11.44(1.67) 10.57(1.13) 
False Alarm / 16 4.00(1.55) 3.30(1.57) 2.61(2.45) 0.85(0.55) 
d' 1.24(0.52) 1.37(0.47) 1.76(0.59) 2.15(0.46) 
c 0.05(0.13) 0.20(0.35) 0.22(0.37) 0.58(0.12) 
 
In the sensitivity analysis, there was a marginal main effect of context training, 
F(1, 27) = 3.08, p = .072, ηp2 = .115, qualified by the predicted interaction between 
word-pair valence and context training, F(1, 27) = 11.70, p = .002, ηp2 = .302, (see 
Figure 1). For the discrimination of neutral word-pairs, those in the neutral context 
training (M = 1.49, SD =.35) were non-significantly better than those in the negative 
context training (M = 1.33, SD = .50), t(30)=1.07, p =.295, d = 0.320. However for the 
discrimination of negative word-pairs, those in the negative context training (M = 
1.93, SD = 0.55) were significantly better than those in the neutral context training (M 
= 1.32, SD=0.47), t(30) = -3.360, p = .002, d =1.109. This indicates that access to 
negative meanings of ambiguous homophones was facilitated by negative context 
training in which participants repeatedly made judgements about unambiguous 
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negative words. Note that context training did not require resolution of ambiguity, and 
therefore suggests that repeated access to negative meanings is sufficient to induce an 
interpretive bias (consistent with passive training conditions in Hoppitt et al. 2010a). 
Additionally, as a long SOA was used, it can be inferred that the induced negative 
interpretive biases observed were at least evident during the later stages of processing, 
when opportunities for controlled or strategic processes became available (consistent 
with Grey & Mathews, 2000; Hoppitt et al., 2010a). Importantly, there were no main 
effects or interactions involving depression, indicating that the context training 
manipulation affected those higher and lower in depressive symptoms equally.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Sensitivity (d’) to homophone prime-target pairs at the 800ms SOA, for 
individuals in neutral and negative context training.   
 
A similar ANOVA on criterion values revealed a marginal main effect for 
context training, F(1, 27) = 4.16, p =.051, ηp2 = .133, that was qualified by a word-
pair valence x context training interaction, F(1, 27) = 4.91, p =.035, ηp2 = .154 (see 
Figure 2). For neutral word-pairs, criterion values did not differ between neutral (M = 
0.85, SD = 0.21) and negative (M = 0.92, SD = 0.22) context training, t(30) = -.872, p 
= .39, d = 0.297. However for negative word-pairs, those in neutral context training 
(M = 0.15, SD = 0.21) were less conservative (more likely to say “related”) than those 
in negative context training (M =.38, SD = .34), t(30) = -2.08, p = .046, d = 0.685.  
This is likely because those in the neutral context training had no prior experience 
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with negative information. For this reason, they were not as good as those in the 
negative context training at classifying negative word-pairs (i.e. they were more likely 
to say “related” to negative word-pairs, but not more likely to be correct in this 
decision).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Criterion values (c) for homophone prime-target pairs at the 800ms SOA, 
for individuals in neutral and negative context training. 
 
There was also a word-pair valence x depression group interaction, F(1, 27) = 9.82, p 
=.004, ηp2 = .267 (see Figure 3). For neutral word-pairs, criterion values did not differ 
between individuals lower in depression (M = 0.88. SD =0.16) or higher in depression 
(M = 0.89, SD = 0.26), t(30) = -.124, p = .902, d = .038. However, for negative word-
pairs, those in the lower depression group (M = 0.15, SD = 0.31) tended to be less 
conservative (more likely to say related) than those in the higher depression group (M 
= 0.36, SD = .33), t(30) = -1.772, p = .087, d = .615. In order to determine whether the 
latter effect was solely attributable to depression, the criterion analysis was repeated 
with anxiety as a between subjects factor, and depression as a covariate. The only 
effect observed was a word-pair valence x anxiety group interaction, F(1, 27) = 5.36, 
p = .028, ηp2  = .166; however, none of the follow up analyses were significant, even 
marginally so. Thus, the word-pair valence x depression group interaction observed 
was likely unique to depression, and strongly argues against a negative response bias 
for those who are higher in symptoms. 
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Figure 3. Criterion values (c) for homophone prime-target pairs at the 800ms SOA, 
for individuals lower and higher in depression.  
 
Response Times 
Response times for related trials were analysed in a 2 (word-pair valence: 
neutral, negative) x 2 (context training: neutral, negative) x 2 (depression: lower, 
higher) mixed model ANOVA, with word-pair valence as a within-subjects variable, 
and context training and depression as between-subjects variables (see Table 3).   As 
with the criterion analysis anxiety was included as a covariate.  The 3-way interaction 
between word-pair valence, context and depression group approached significance, 
F(1, 27) = 3.520, p = .066, ηp2 = .119. Because this interaction was of theoretical 
interest, it was explored further. However, none of the follow-up analyses were 
significant. No other significant effects were observed.  
Unrelated trials were not analysed, specifically because they would not have 
provided a sufficient baseline for comparison. Firstly, in a relatedness judgement, the 
unrelated condition leads to a different response (no) than in the related condition 
(yes), and therefore its use as a baseline is problematic. Secondly, in the current study 
the criterion analyses revealed that deciding whether a word-pair was unrelated was 
actually affected by context and depression (see Table 2). 
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Table 3.  
Reaction Times to Correctly Identified Related Targets for Individuals in Experiment 
1 (800ms SOA). 
 Neutral Context Training Negative Context Training 
  
Lower SDS 
N = 6 
Higher SDS 
N = 10 
Lower SDS 
N = 9 
Higher SDS 
N = 7 
 M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
Neutral Homophones 798(186) 675(15) 695 (67) 780(309) 
Negative Homophones 728(165) 704(40) 699(113) 678(129) 
 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 indicated that for individuals in negative context training, those 
lower and higher in depressive symptoms performed equally on the interpretation 
task. Specifically, both groups exhibited a negative interpretive bias. Experiment 1 
used a long SOA of 800ms, allowing for controlled or strategic processes to become 
available. However, cognitive theories on depression posit that exposure to negative 
information automatically activates negative schema in those vulnerable to the 
disorder, and that this in turn results in a negative interpretive bias (see, Beck, 1976, 
1987, 2008; Beck & Clarke, 1988; Bower, 1981; DeRaedt & Coster, 2010; Pearsons 
& Miranda, 1992; Sheppard & Teasdale, 2004). In order to test this hypothesis and 
tap into the early stages of processing, Experiment 2 was run at an SOA of 400ms.   
If context leads to the automatic activation of related concepts, then those in 
negative context training will be faster and more accurate at deciding that an 
ambiguous homophone-target pair is related when resolved in a negative as opposed 
to neutral manner (reflected in a word-pair valence x context training interaction). 
Furthermore, if those scoring higher in depression are biased towards negative 
interpretation in general, then compared to those lower in depression, those higher in 
depression should be faster and more accurate at negatively valenced targets overall 
(reflected in a word-pair valence x depression interaction). Alternatively, if those 
scoring higher in depression have greater reactivity to emotional context, then 
compared to those lower in depression, those higher in depression should be faster 
and more accurate at negatively valenced targets, but only when in the negative 
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context condition (reflected in a word-pair valence x context training x depression 
interaction).  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 50 undergraduate students enrolled in a 200-level cognitive 
psychology course at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. They 
voluntarily took part in the experiment during one of their weekly labs. Participants 
consisted of 13 men, and 36 women, with mean ages of 21 (range 18-37) and 20 
respectively (range 18-23)3.  
Stimuli  
 Stimuli were identical to Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except that a 400ms SOA was 
used instead of a 800ms SOA. Additionally, given the nature of the testing situation, 
large groups of participants (between 10 –20) were run at a time.  
Results and Discussion 
All participants met the criteria for distinguishing between related and 
unrelated word-pairs. That is, their sensitivity values were above 0.8 for both neutral 
and negative homophone pairs. This criteria differed slighter from Experiment 1, as 
the task was much harder (due to the 400ms SOA) and participants were perhaps 
more susceptible to distraction (as they were tested in larger groups). This also meant 
that the number of participants in neutral and negative context training slightly 
differed (neutral context training, n = 27; negative context training n = 23). 
Depression and anxiety scores are presented in Table 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 One participant did not disclose their demographic information.  
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Table 4.  
Depression and Anxiety Scores for Individuals in Experiment 2.  
  Neutral Context Training  Negative Context Training 
 * 
Lower SDS 
n = 18 
Higher SDS 
n = 9  
Lower SDS 
n = 9 
Higher SDS 
n = 14 
 M(SD) M(SD)  M(SD) M(SD) 
SDS 28.83(4.19) 48.00  (3.64)  30.56(3.43) 41.64(5.96) 
SAS 28.89(4.61) 44.56(10.90)  28.89(4.48) 35.57(7.93) 
*As with experiment 1, group numbers are unequal as context training was randomly 
assigned before participants completed the mood questionnaires.  
 
As with Experiment 1, a median split was performed on the SDS. Those scoring 
between 22 and 34 were classified as “lower depression” and those between 35 and 58 
as “higher depression”.  Consistent with previous literature, depression and anxiety 
scales were highly correlated r(48) = .834, p = <.001. Anxiety was used as a covariate 
in all depression analysis. However, in order to ensure that any potential depression 
effects were solely attributed to depression, depression analyses were run with anxiety 
as a between subjects variable and depression as a covariate. Therefore a median split 
was also performed on the SAS. Those scoring between 21 and 31 were classified as 
“lower anxiety” and those between 32 and 58 as “higher anxiety”.  Although 
participants completed a context training block and an interpretation block, only the 
latter was analysed, as it was the critical block of interest. Related response times and 
accuracy were analysed in the same way as Experiment 1.  
Accuracy 
 Sensitivity (d’) and criterion (c) values were separately analysed in a 2 (word-
pair valence: neutral, negative) x 2 (context training: neutral, negative) x 2 
(depression: lower, higher) mixed model ANOVA, with word-pair valence as a 
within-subject variable and context and depression as between-subject variables (see 
Table 5). Anxiety was used as a covariate. 
 
 
 
 
THE TIME COURSE OF INDUCED INTERPRETIVE BIASES 
 
39 
Table 5.  
Accuracy of Homophone Prime-Target Pairs for Individuals in Experiment 2 (400ms 
SOA). 
  
Neutral Context Training Negative Context Training 
Lower SDS 
N=18 
Higher SDS 
N=9 
Lower SDS 
N=9 
Higher SDS 
N=14 
 M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
Neutral Homophones     
Hit / 16 7.39(1.38) 7.67(2.00) 7.78(1.86) 7.14(1.75) 
False Alarm / 16 1.00(0.69) 1.05(1.49) 0.94(0.92) 0.89(0.92) 
d' 1.54(0.39) 1.64(0.31) 1.65(0.41) 1.58(0.30) 
c 0.82(0.18) 0.83(0.37) 0.83(0.29) 0.88(0.28) 
Negative Homophones         
Hit / 16 9.83(1.89) 9.67(2.29) 9.44(2.79) 11.00(1.75) 
False Alarm / 16 1.69(1.03) 2.61(1.50) 1.89(1.87) 1.50(0.92) 
d' 1.60(0.35) 1.35(0.28) 1.58(0.63) 1.89(0.40) 
c 0.48(0.28) 0.35(0.41) 0.52(0.45) 0.39(0.30) 
 
The only effect observed was the predicted word-pair valence x context training x 
depression interaction, F(1, 45) = 5.27, p = .026, ηp2 = .105. For participants in the 
lower depression group (see Figure 4), the word-pair x context training interaction 
was not significant, F(1,24) = .41, p = .528, ηp2 = .017. In other words, discrimination 
of related from unrelated word-pairs was equal for negative and neutral targets, 
regardless of context training. This indicated that training with negative word pairs 
did not facilitate access to negative meanings of ambiguous words for lower 
depression participants. This finding is consistent with theories of non-emotional 
ambiguity resolution, that posit automatic activation of all word meanings in the early 
stages of processing (Simpson, 1984; Simpson & Burgess, 1985; Simpson & Kang, 
1994; Simpson & Krueger, 1991; Swinney, 1979). However, the word-pair x context 
training interaction was significant for those in the higher depression group, F(1, 20) 
= 5.74, p = .026, ηp2 =.223 (see Figure 3). For higher depression participants, 
discrimination of related from unrelated neutral word-pairs was not affected by 
context training, t(21) = .51, p = .618, d = .211. In contrast, discrimination of related 
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from unrelated negative word-pairs was significantly better following negative 
context training than neutral context training, t(21) = -3.53, p = .002, d = 1.366. In 
other words, for participants high in depressive symptoms, negative context training 
automatically activated related concepts, such that participants were better able to 
identify emotionally ambiguous homophones that were resolved in a negative as 
opposed to neutral manner. The criterion analysis did not reveal any significant 
effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Sensitivity (d’) to homophone prime-target pairs at the 400ms SOA, for 
individuals lower and higher in depression, and in neutral and negative context 
training.  
 
In order to determine whether the negative interpretive bias observed for those 
scoring high in depression was specific to depression, sensitivity (d’) and criterion (c) 
values were separately analysed in a 2 (word-pair valence: neutral, negative) x 2 
(context training: neutral, negative) x 2 (anxiety: lower, higher) mixed model 
ANOVA, with word-pair valence as a within-subject variable and context training and 
anxiety as between-subject variables. Depression was used as a covariate. No 
significant effects were observed in the sensitivity analyses, including the word-pair 
valence x context training x anxiety interaction, F(1, 45) = .01, p = .949, ηp2 = .001. 
Similarly, no significant effects were observed in the criterion analyses. This indicates 
that the depression effect observed in the sensitivity analysis can be specifically 
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attributed to depression, as not only was anxiety adequately controlled for, but when 
the same analyses was run with anxiety as a between-subjects variable and depression 
as a covariate, no significant effects were observed. Thus, the sensitivity results 
combined suggest that vulnerability to depression is reflected in greater reactivity to 
emotional context. 
Response Times 
 Response times for related word pairs were analysed in a 2 (word-pair 
valence: neutral, negative) x 2 (context training: neutral, negative) x 2 (depression: 
lower, higher) mixed model ANOVA, with word-pair valence as a within-subjects 
variable, and context group and depression as between-subjects variable (see Table 6).  
No significant effects were observed. For the same reasons in Experiment 1, response 
times to unrelated word-pair trials were not analysed. 
 
Table 6.  
Reaction Times to Correctly Identified Related Targets for Individuals in Experiment 
2 (400ms SOA).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Discussion 
Cognitive theories of emotional disorders suggest that anxious and depressed 
individuals consistently interpret ambiguous information in a negative manner, and 
that this negative interpretive bias might play a role in the cause and maintenance of 
their disorder (see, Beck, 1976, 1987, 2008; Beck & Clarke, 1988; Bower, 1981; 
DeRaedt & Coster, 2010; Pearsons & Miranda, 1992; Sheppard & Teasdale, 2004).  
While anxiety-linked interpretive biases have been well established (Byrne & 
Eysenck, 1993; Calvo & Castillo, 1997; Hadwin et al., 1997; MacLeod & Cohen, 
1993; Mathews et al., 1989; Richards & French, 1992), empirical research on 
  Neutral Context Training Negative Context Training 
 
Lower SDS 
N=18 
Higher SDS 
N=9 
Lower SDS 
N=9 
Higher SDS 
N=14 
 M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
Neutral Homophones 759(153) 745  (62) 838(151) 774(126) 
Negative Homophones 773(190) 742(140) 779(106) 768(72) 
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depression-linked interpretive biases has yielded mixed results (Bisson & Sears, 2007; 
Butler & Mathews, 1983; Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; 
Lawson et al., 2002; Mogg et al., 2006; Sears et al., 2010; Weinzlaff & Eisenberg, 
2001).  This is likely due to differing methodologies and the use of statistical 
techniques that do not adequately control for anxiety.  
The aim of the current study was to use a cognitive bias modification 
procedure to detect induced interpretive biases in healthy individuals. As there was 
large variability in depression scores, a median split was used create two groups: 
lower depression and higher depression. Although individuals in the higher 
depression group were not depressed, it is fair to say that they were likely more 
vulnerable to depression compared to those in the lower depression group. It was also 
of primary interest to determine the time-course of induced interpretive biases. 
Individuals in the lower and higher depression groups were allocated to either neutral 
or negative context training conditions, in which they repeatedly made relatedness 
judgements about valenced words. They then completed an interpretation block, in 
which they were required to make relatedness judgements about ambiguous 
homophones. Experiment 1 used an SOA of 800 ms, and Experiment 2 an SOA of 
400ms. However, Experiment 2 will be discussed first, as it assessed the early stages 
of processing, followed by Experiment 1, in which the later stages of processing were 
assessed.  
Experiment 2 showed that, in the early stages of processing, negative context 
training induced a negative interpretive bias in the higher but not the lower depression 
group. In other words, after repeatedly making judgments about unambiguous 
negative word-pairs, individuals in the higher depression group obtained higher 
sensitivity values for negative than neutral interpretations of ambiguous words, 
whereas sensitivity values did not differ for individuals in the lower depression group. 
Conversely, Experiment 1 showed that, in the later stages of processing, negative 
context training induced negative interpretive biases in all individuals, regardless of 
depression scores. In other words, after repeatedly making judgements about 
unambiguous negative word-pairs, individuals in lower and higher depression groups 
obtained higher sensitivity values for negative as opposed to neutral interpretations of 
ambiguous words. In regard to response bias, results indicated that in the early 
(Experiment 2) and later stages (Experiment 1) of processing all individuals were 
conservative in their responses. That is, when faced with a homophone prime-target 
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pair they were more likely to say “unrelated” than “related”. This finding in itself 
illustrates how difficult the task was.  Overall, the results suggest that, given sufficient 
time, healthy individuals successfully use context as a cue to guide the interpretation 
of ambiguous information. However, those vulnerable to depression are uniquely 
receptive to negative contextual cues in the earlier stages of processing.  
Previous Research 
Although not directly comparable, findings are consistent with depression-
linked interpretive biases observed in self-report (Butler & Mathews, 1983) 
homophone spelling (Mogg et al., 2006; Wenzlaff & Eisenberg, 2001) text 
comprehension (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009), semantic priming (Sears et al., 2010) and 
blink reflex tasks (Lawson et al. 2002). Notably, self-report and homophone spelling 
tasks have been extensively criticised for their susceptibility to response bias. That is, 
rather than showing an enhanced sensitivity to negative interpretations, individuals in 
these tasks might have been more inclined to report negative as opposed to neutral 
interpretations. This possibility can be ruled out in the current study, as accuracy was 
analysed according to Signal Detection Theory and thus provided a measure of 
interpretive bias (sensitivity) independent of response bias (criterion).  
 Early stages of processing.  
The current study contributes to the literature in the assessment of the time-
course of depression-linked interpretive biases. Only a handful of studies have 
assessed whether depression-linked interpretive biases are detectable at the early 
stages of processing. In a study by Wenzlaff and Eisenberg (2001), chronically 
dysphoric, previously dysphoric, and non-dysphoric individuals completed a modified 
version of the homophone spelling task. That is, after hearing neutral/negative (e.g. 
dye/die) and neutral/positive (e.g. piece/peace) homophones, they were required to 
write down the word they heard. In one condition, individuals only had three seconds 
to respond, thus their immediate interpretations were assessed. In this condition, 
Wenzlaff and Eisenberg found that both chronically dysphoric and previously 
dysphoric individuals were more likely to write down negative spellings of 
neutral/negative homophones, and neutral spellings of neutral/positive homophones. 
The opposite effect was reported for non-dysphoric individuals. Thus, the authors 
inferred that chronically dysphoric and previously dysphoric individuals displayed a 
negative interpretive bias at the early stages of processing.  
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Blanchette and Richards (2003) examined the role of context on anxiety-
linked interpretive biases at early stages of processing. This is relevant to the current 
study, as it is the only other study to have directly assessed the role of context in 
emotional vulnerability. State-anxious and non-anxious participants heard emotional 
homophones (e.g. dye/die) and then saw contextual cues (e.g. death). In one of their 
experiments, contextual cues were presented subliminally, thus tapping into the early 
stages of processing. Participants were simply required to write down the word they 
heard (e.g. dye or die). Thus rather than contextual cues being presented in a training 
block, as in the current study, they were presented before each interpretation trial. 
Nevertheless, Blanchette and Richards reported that anxious participants were 
particularly sensitive to contextual cues (neutral, negative and positive valence) when 
they were presented subliminally (tapping into the early stages of processing), 
whereas non-anxious participants were not. 
In a semantic priming task by Sears et al. (2010), dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
individuals heard ambiguous sentences, and related (neutral, negative or positive) and 
unrelated targets. Rather than making a lexical decision (as in Bisson & Sears, 2007; 
Lawson & MacLeod, 1999), individuals were required to judge the relatedness of the 
prime-target pairs. Reaction time and accuracy was assessed. Further, accuracy was 
split into ‘hits’ (responding related to a related target), false alarms (responding 
related to an unrelated target), correction rejections (responding unrelated to an 
unrelated target), and misses (responding unrelated to a related target). Although 
Sears et al. did not report any significant effects in their reaction time data, they did 
report that dysphoric individuals were more likely to ‘miss’ positive targets, and less 
likely to ‘miss’ negative targets.  The authors manipulated ISI (0ms & 1000ms), but 
did not obtain any interactions with this variable. Thus, miss rates were averaged 
across 0ms and 1000ms ISI conditions. Nevertheless, Sears et al. still concluded that 
dysphoric individuals displayed a negative interpretive bias at the early stages of 
processing.  
In the current study, Experiment 2 (with a 400ms SOA) showed that after 
negative context training, individuals in the higher depression group were more likely 
to select negative than neutral interpretations of ambiguous words. The same was not 
true for individuals in the lower depression group, or individuals in the higher 
depression group and in neutral context training. Thus, only after negative schemas 
were activated (through repeated access to negatively valenced word-pairs) did 
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individuals vulnerable to depression exhibit a negative interpretive bias at the early 
stages of processing. Results from Experiment 2 are consistent with previous research 
that has assessed depression-linked interpretive biases at the early stages of 
processing (Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Sears et al. 2010; Wenzlaff & Eisenburg, 
2001). However, unique to the current study, anxiety was adequately controlled for, 
and the measure of interpretive bias obtained (sensitivity) was independent of 
response bias (criterion). In fact, from a methodological standpoint, it appears that 
accuracy is a more sensitive measure of interpretation than reaction time, at least in 
semantic priming paradigms. Like the current study, Sears et al. only obtained 
significant effects in their accuracy as opposed to reaction time data. Furthermore, 
Lawson et al (2002) have already raised concerns about solely relying on the speed of 
responses in interpretation tasks, especially in depression whereby reaction times can 
be slower (Azorin, Benhaïm, Hasbroucq, Possamaï, 1995) and more variable (Byrne, 
1976).  
Importantly, the fact that depression-linked interpretive biases were detected at 
the early stages of processing helps provide clarity on controversial debate in the 
literature.  Although automatic and persistent depression-linked interpretive biases are 
predicted by the majority of cognitive theories on depression (e.g. Beck, 1976, 1987, 
2008; Beck & Clark, 1988; Bower, 1981; DeRaedt & Coster, 2010; Pearsons & 
Miranda, 1992; Sheppard & Teasdale, 2004) there has been little empirical support for 
this notion, specifically in studies that use behaviour measures. This has led 
researchers to question whether, in fact, depression-linked interpretive biases are 
effortful and controlled (e.g. Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1988, 1997).  
Integrating both theories, Shestyuk and Deldin (2010) have recently proposed 
that self-referential processing biases in depression result from abnormalities in both 
automatic and controlled processes. They recorded Event Related Potentials (ERPs) 
during the encoding stages of self-referent or other-referent words. Automatic 
processing biases were indexed by the P2 component (see Crowley & Colrain, 2004), 
and controlled processes by the late positive component (see Johnson, 1995; 
Naumann, Bartussek, Diedrich, & Laufer, 1992).  Shestyuk and Deldin found that 
currently depressed and previously depressed participants exhibited greater P2 
activation during the encoding of negative relative to positive self-referent words, 
where as the opposite was true of controls. Furthermore, whereas currently depressed 
individuals showed greater activation of the late positive component during the 
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encoding of negative as opposed to positive self-referent words, the opposite was true 
of previously depressed participants. That is, like controls, previously depressed 
participants exhibited greater activation of the late positive component during the 
encoding of positive relative to negative self-referent words. Shestyuk and Deldin 
thus suggested that automatic processing biases reflect vulnerability to depression, 
whereas controlled processing biases reflect a mood dependant feature of the disorder. 
This theory fits nicely with Wenzlaff and Eisenberg’s (2002) data, and is also 
consistent with the findings reported in the current study.  
Later stages of processing.  
Two of the studies aforementioned also assessed whether depression-linked 
interpretive biases were detectable at the later stages of processing. Wenzlaff and 
Eisenberg (2001) assessed individuals’ delayed interpretations of ambiguous 
homophones. In this condition, individuals were given thirteen seconds (as opposed to 
three seconds) to write down the word they heard. Wenzlaff and Eisenberg found that 
chronically dysphoric individuals continued to display a negative interpretive bias. 
However, previously dysphoric individuals did not. Instead, like non-dysphoric 
individuals, previously dysphoric individuals displayed a positive interpretive bias at 
the later stages of processing. Combining their time-course findings, Wenzlaff and 
Eisenberg suggested that previously dysphoric individuals do not lose the negative 
cognitions associated with a prior dysphoric episode, but rather become better at 
controlling them.  
In another of Blanchette and Richards (2003) experiments, state-anxious and 
non-anxious individuals heard emotional homophones (e.g. dye/die). However, this 
time contextual cues were presented supraliminally (thus tapping into controlled 
processes). Soon after, a target appeared. The target was one of the spellings of the 
homophone (e.g. dye or die) or a non-word. Participants were required to make a 
lexical decision on the target. Blanchette and Richards found that state anxious 
individuals were still faster to respond to contextually congruent targets; however, this 
time, the same effect was evident for non-anxious individuals. Blanchette have since 
replicated this finding in naturally occurring state-anxiety (i.e. with individuals 
awaiting dental treatment; Blanchette, Richards & Munjiza, 2007). Combining 
subliminal and supraliminal priming findings, Blanchette and Richards concluded that 
state anxiety was linked to an automatic enhanced sensitivity to emotional context, 
and later referred to this as the “context hypothesis”.   
THE TIME COURSE OF INDUCED INTERPRETIVE BIASES 
 
47 
Interestingly, although the current study focused on depression as opposed to 
anxiety, results are also consistent with the “context hypothesis”. In Experiment 1, all 
individuals, regardless of depression scores, were sensitive to negative contextual 
cues at the later stages of processing (consistent with effects observed in Blanchette 
and Richard’s, 2003 supraliminal priming experiment). On the other hand, in 
Experiment 2, individuals scoring high but not low in depression showed an enhanced 
sensitivity to negative contextual cues in the early stages of processing (consistent 
with the effects observed in Blanchette and Richards subliminal priming experiment).  
However, in order to determine whether those scoring relatively higher as opposed to 
lower in depression were uniquely receptive to contextual cues in general, a positive 
training condition would need to be included. Nevertheless, along with the findings 
from Wenzlaff and Eisenberg (2001), and Blanchette and Richards (2003), results 
from the current study suggest that at the later stages of processing interpretive biases 
are not invariant; that is, under the right experimental conditions, they are malleable 
to change. This notion is supported in studies that modify interpretive biases through 
training.  
In the current study, results observed at the later stages of processing are 
directly comparable to studies utilising cognitive bias modification procedures. In a 
series of studies, Grey and Mathews (2000) examined the effects of active and passive 
training on the subsequent interpretation of ambiguous information. During active 
training participants were required to actively generate appropriate valenced targets. 
For example, after being presented with an ambiguous word (e.g. beat), participants in 
threat training were required to generate the threat as opposed to non-threat meaning 
by completing a word fragment (e.g. police / p _li _ e as opposed to rhythm/ r_yt_m ). 
During passive training participants were exposed to appropriate valenced targets, but 
did not have to generate training-congruent meanings. For example, those in threat 
training had to verify the association between police-beat whereas those in non-threat 
training had to verify the association between rhythm-beat (i.e. the ambiguous word 
was presented as a target, to prevent participants from accessing both meanings). Grey 
and Mathews reported that after both active and passive training participants were 
more likely to interpret ambiguous words in a training-congruent manner. Notably, in 
their interpretation phases, an SOA of 750ms was used, thus tapping into the later 
stages of processing.  
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In the current study, individuals partook in neutral or negative context 
training. That is, they either had to verify the association between unambiguous 
neutral word-pairs (e.g. cat-dog) or unambiguous negative word-pairs (e.g. depressed-
lonely). This is equivalent to what the CBM-I literature refers to as passive training. 
Like findings from Grey and Mathews (2000), during the later stages of processing, 
individuals in the current study were more likely to resolve ambiguous words in a 
training-congruent manner. Importantly, this effect did not interact with depression, 
suggesting that at the later stages of processing vulnerability factors are not solely 
responsible for inducing negative interpretive biases. Potential mechanisms for the 
replicable training-congruent effect, at the later stages of processing, are now 
discussed. There are four possible contenders: demand effects, undetected mood 
changes, emotional category priming and transfer of processing.    
Potential Mechanisms Underlying Strategically Induced Biases 
Demand effects. 
Demand effects could have been responsible for inducing interpretive biases at 
the later stages of processing. Specifically, it could be that individuals were aware of 
the purpose of the task, and performed in a way consistent with experimenter 
expectations. However, this possibility is highly unlikely. Feedback to the 
experimenter indicated that many participants did not even notice that some of the 
words they heard were ambiguous. Furthermore, the task itself was difficult. It 
required participants to make speeded judgements to prime-target pairs that were 
presented less than a second apart. The window of time to respond was no greater 
than 1750ms.  In fact, the difficulty of the task was confirmed by the number of 
individuals who did not meet sensitivity requirements, and were consequently 
excluded from the data analysis (i.e. their ability to distinguish related word-pairs 
from unrelated word-pairs was not above chance). The task difficulty was also 
confirmed in criterion values. All participants were conservative in their responses. 
That is, they were more likely to say “unrelated” than “related’ when faced with a 
homophone prime-target pair. Thus, it is unlikely that participants had the cognitive 
resources available to respond to perceived demand.  
Undetected mood changes. 
It is also possible that induced negative interpretive biases at the later stages of 
processing were a result of undetected mood changes arising from negative context 
training. Specifically, repeated access to negatively valenced word-pairs might have 
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induced a negative mood-state in individuals, which led them to interpret homophones 
in a negative as opposed to neutral manner. To rule out this possibility, mood-state 
should have been assessed before and after training. Nonetheless, this explanation still 
seems unlikely. In CBM-I tasks, where training involves passages of text, mood state 
has been reportedly modified in a training-congruent manner (e.g. Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000b); however, such an effect is typically absent in  CBM-I tasks, like 
the current study, where training involves single words (e.g. Hoppitt et al., 2010a; 
Wilson et al., 2006). This seems logical, as individuals who participate in 
experimental tasks are skilled readers, who come across negatively valenced single 
words everyday. These negative valenced single words do not typically evoke 
noticeable feelings of sadness etc.   
It is important to note, that although training with negatively valenced single 
words might not directly affect an individuals’ mood state, it may affect their 
emotional reactivity to stressful events.  For example, Wilson et al. (2006) conducted 
a CBM-I task that consisted of three phases: training, interpretation, and emotional 
reactivity. In the training phase, healthy individuals were trained to interpret 
ambiguous information in either a non-threatening or threatening manner. In the 
interpretation phase, individuals in threat-training were more likely to interpret 
ambiguous information in a negative as opposed to neutral manner (consistent with 
the findings reported in Experiment 1 of the current study). Importantly, threat-
training did not affect mood state after training. However, in the emotional reactivity 
phase, individuals were required to watch a potentially stressful video. Wilson et al. 
found that after viewing this video, individuals in threat training reported greater 
increases in negative mood, than individuals in non-threat training. Thus, Wilson et 
al’s results showed that valence training did not affect individuals’ current mood state, 
but it did affect their later emotional reactivity to stressful events; This effect has been 
extensively replicated (see, Hirsch, Mathews & Clark, 2007; Hoppitt et al., 2010a, 
Hoppitt et al., 2010b; Mackintosh et al., 2006; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002).  
Emotional category priming. 
The interpretive biases reported in the current study could also have been due 
to emotional category priming (Higgins, 1989; Hill & Kemp Wheeler, 1989). That is, 
repeated access to negatively valenced meanings (i.e. negative context training) might 
have primed an entire category of negative interpretations, such that when presented 
with ambiguous information, negatively related meanings were more readily available 
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than neutrally related meanings. In fact, this is the mechanism that Grey and Mathews 
(2000) deemed the most plausible explanation of the training-congruent biases 
observed in their studies.  However, Wilson et al. (2006) have shown that emotional 
category priming cannot be the only factor responsible for training congruent biases.  
As previously mentioned, Wilson et al. (2006) carried out a CBM-I task with 
three phases: training, interpretation and emotional reactivity. In the training phase, 
participants were actively trained to interpret ambiguous information in either a 
threatening or non-threatening manner. Crucially, in the interpretation phase, they 
were presented with ambiguous word-pairs and unambiguous word-pairs (threat and 
non-threat). Wilson et al. reported that while individuals responded to ambiguous 
prime words in a training-congruent manner, the same was not true of unambiguous 
prime words. In other words, individuals in threat training were no faster at 
responding to unambiguous threatening word-pairs, than individuals in non-threat 
training. This suggested that active threat training did not simply prime threat related 
meanings in general, but rather uniquely influenced the ability to access negative 
interpretations of ambiguous word meanings.  Notably, as all participants in Wilson et 
al’s study completed active training, their study could not determine whether the same 
mechanism was responsible for passive training.  
Transfer of processing.  
The first study to tease apart the mechanisms involved in active and passive 
training came from Hoppitt et al. (2010a). They suggested that in active training, 
training-congruent biases emerged due to transfer of processing (other wise known as 
the learning of an implicit production rule). Specifically, participants learn to select 
training-congruent interpretations through practice, and transfer this rule to novel 
ambiguous information. Thus, they suggested that active training uniquely influences 
the ability to access training-congruent meanings of ambiguous information. If this 
hypothesis were correct, then as in Wilson et al. (2006), in an interpretation phase 
individuals in active threat training should be faster to respond to threatening targets, 
but only if preceded by an ambiguous prime. Alternatively, they suggested that in 
passive training, training-congruent biases emerged due to the priming of an entire 
category of training-congruent meanings (i.e. emotional category priming). For 
example, after repeatedly accessing threatening words, all threat related meanings 
become available, and thus individuals are primed to respond to all subsequently 
presented threatening information. If this hypothesis were correct, then in an 
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interpretation phase, individuals in passive threat training should be faster to respond 
to threatening targets preceded by ambiguous primes and unambiguous threatening 
primes.  
Hoppitt et al. (2010a) actually found that both active and passive threat 
training resulted in faster responses to threatening targets preceded by ambiguous and 
unambiguous primes. This finding alone suggested to the authors that the same 
mechanism was responsible for active and passive training, namely emotional 
category priming. However, Hoppitt et al. (2010a) added the same third phase to their 
experiment as Wilson et al. (2006). Individuals were required to watch a potentially 
stressful video, after which their mood was assessed. Results showed that individuals 
in active threat training reported greater increases in anxiety after the video than 
individuals in passive threat training. The question then remained, if threat biases 
were induced via the same mechanism, then why were individuals in active training 
more emotionally reactive to the potentially stressful video than individuals in passive 
threat training? Hoppitt et al. (2010a) suggested that the most parsimonious 
explanation had to be that active training did indeed result from transfer of processing. 
Individuals in active threat training must have become practiced at resolving 
ambiguous information in a threatening manner, thus when presented with subsequent 
stressful videos (e.g. of a man drowning and being rescued by a police officer), they 
focused on the threatening (e.g. the man could have died) as opposed to non-
threatening (e.g. the heroic save) aspects, which in turn affected their mood state. 
As the current study did not include unambiguous word-pairs in the 
interpretation block, it is difficult to determine whether interpretive biases at the later 
stages of processing resulted from transfer of processing or emotional category 
priming. On the one hand, in negative context training individuals were required to 
repeatedly make judgments about negative word-pairs. Neither primes nor targets 
were ambiguous, thus individuals could not have become practiced at selecting 
negative as opposed to neutral interpretations of ambiguous information. In 
conjunction with the fact that training was most consistent with the requirements of 
passive than active training, it is entirely possible that interpretive biases occurred due 
to emotional category priming.  
On the other hand, in the current study, the actual task requirement in the 
context training phase and the interpretation phase did not differ. That is, in both 
phases participants heard a word, saw a word, and had to decide whether or not they 
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were related. Thus, it is plausible that individuals in negative context training 
transferred some learning from context training to the interpretation phase. Negative 
valenced words form a tight cohesive category, so deciding whether or not two 
negatively valenced words are related or unrelated is a hard task. For example, 
consider the word-pairs crash-wreck (related) and crash-bitter (unrelated). Although 
crash-wreck is obviously related, deciding the relatedness of crash-bitter is not as 
clear. This is not because this particular word-pair was ineffectively matched, but 
rather because any two negatively valenced words can be seen as related, even 
distantly so. For example crash-argue, crash-lonely, crash-evil, crash-wrong, crash-
ugly etc. Thus, individuals in negative context training would have likely come into 
the interpretation phase with a criterion of what they considered negatively related, 
and negative unrelated. For this reason, when faced with homophones (e.g. 
steel/steal), they might have been better at discriminating negative (e.g. steal-rob = 
related; steal-mean = unrelated) than neutral interpretations (e.g. steel-iron = related; 
steel-fog = unrelated). This of course is compared to individuals in neutral context 
training, who had no prior experience discriminating negatively valenced word-pairs.  
In summary, the mechanisms responsible for induced training-congruent biases, at the 
later stages of processing, in the current study, remain unclear. The pattern of results 
observed is consistent with both emotional category priming and transfer of 
processing mechanisms. 
Future Directions 
First, it is important to note, that the sample sizes in the current study 
(especially Experiment 1) were relatively small, and thus potentially under powered. 
It is possible, for example, that compared to those scoring lower in depression, 
individuals scoring higher in depression were more sensitive to detect negative 
homophones at both the early (Experiment 2) and later stages (Experiment 1) of 
processing.  
A further limitation of the current study is that context training might have 
altered participants’ responses on the mood questionnaires, which were always 
administered at the end of the task. In other words, after repeatedly making 
judgements about negatively valenced words (e.g. loser-jerk; rape-victim; sick-
vomit), some individuals (perhaps those particularly susceptible to demand effects) 
might have been more inclined to answer depression-related questions in a slightly 
more pessimistic manner. For example, when asked the question I feel down-hearted 
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a blue some individuals might have responded some of the time as opposed to a little 
of the time.  These slight variations in responses could have shifted an individual from 
being in the lower depression group to the higher depression group, especially as this 
decision was simply based off a median-split. This of course could have obscured any 
depression effects observed at the early stages of processing. In fact, there is data to 
support this hypothesis. In Experiment 2, individuals scoring relatively higher as 
opposed to lower in depression were disproportionately split across context training 
conditions (neutral context training, n=9; negative context training, n=14). Similarly, 
individuals scoring relatively lower compared to relatively higher in depression were 
also disproportionately spilt across context training conditions (neutral context 
training, n=18; negative context training, n=9). In future, the order in which mood 
questionnaires are administered should be counterbalanced – half of individuals 
should fill them out before the cross-modal priming task, and the other half after the 
cross-modal priming task. This counterbalance could then be added as a between-
subjects factor in the analysis of results.  Furthermore, rather than classifying 
individuals as low or high in depression based off a median split, upper and lower 
quartiles could be used, as individuals scoring closer to the middle range would be the 
ones that would shift from the lower depression group to the higher depression group.  
Second, in the current study, the context training and interpretation phases 
were identical in task requirements. That is, in both blocks participants heard and saw 
words and were required to make a relatedness judgment (decide whether the two 
words were related or unrelated). In order to test the boundaries of passive training in 
CBM-I, it would be beneficial to change the context training task from a relatedness 
judgement to a lexical decision. For example, in negative context training, individuals 
would hear a negative prime (e.g. rage), and then see a negative related target (e.g. 
anger), a negative unrelated target (e.g. grave) or a non-word target (e.g. anter). They 
would then be required to decide whether the target was a word or a non-word. Thus, 
participants would still be exposed to negatively valenced information, and thus meet 
the requirements of passive training, but would only be required to access the lexical 
content of the target, not necessarily its semantic meaning or its semantic relationship 
with the prime. Findings from this task would shed light on the level of access 
required to induce interpretive biases. It would also help to clarify the cognitive 
mechanism involved in inducing interpretive biases. Specifically, if a lexical decision 
task was used in context training and a relatedness judgement in the interpretation 
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phase, individuals might be less likely to transfer learning (as the tasks would be 
fundamentally different).  
Third, although individuals in the current study varied in degree of symptoms, 
they were still in the healthy range for depression. Thus, it remains unclear as to 
whether results from the present study generalise to (sub)clinical populations (e.g. 
Haaga & Solomon, 1993; Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen, & Ingram, 1987). 
Furthermore, despite the fact individuals who partook in the study were not currently 
depressed, it is unknown as to whether individuals in Experiment 2 (400ms SOA) had 
been depressed in the past, as they consisted of a different population sample that 
Experiment 1 (800ms SOA). As previously discussed, Wenzlaff and Eisenberg (2001) 
reported that in the early stages of processing, previously dysphoric individuals were 
reminiscent of currently dysphoric individuals (negative interpretive bias), whereas in 
the later stages of processing they were more reminiscent of non-dysphoric 
individuals (positive interpretive bias). Thus, it would be advantageous to test the 
current research paradigm on previously depressed individuals, and individual’s 
vulnerable to depression that have never been depressed in the past. This would 
determine whether enhanced sensitivity to negative contextual cues at the early stages 
of processing is attributable to the cognitions associated with vulnerability or a 
depressive episode.  Along with neutral and negative context training, a no-training 
condition should also be included, in order to provide a baseline measure. For 
example, in the early stages of processing, previously depressed individuals might 
display a negative interpretive bias without any prior training (as in Wenzlaff and 
Eisenberg).  
Finally, in the current study, neutral context training only produced non-
significant neutral interpretive biases. This is likely because ‘neutral’ is not a salient 
emotion, and similarly forms less of a cohesive category than ‘negative’. Future 
studies should explore the effect of positively valenced information on subsequent 
interpretation in depression. Individuals would repeatedly make judgements about 
unambiguous positive word-pairs (e.g. happy-smile; hug-kiss; trophy-win), then make 
judgements about positive/neutral homophones (e.g. piece/peace). It would be of 
particular interest to look at how previously depressed individuals responded to 
positive context training at the early and later stages of processing. For example, if 
previously depressed individuals sustain the negative cognitions associated with a 
prior depressive episode, but have developed strategies to counter them (Wenzlaff & 
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Eisenburg, 2001), then after positive context training they might be more likely to 
interpret ambiguous information in a positive (e.g. peace-love) as opposed to neutral 
(e.g. piece-portion) manner, but only at the later stages of processing.  
Promising results from recent CBM-I studies confirm the need to expand the 
current research paradigm to include positively valenced information. Blackwell and 
Holmes (2010) found that after repeated CBM-I training sessions involving positive 
imagery, four out of seven clinically depressed individuals reported substantial 
improvements in interpretation and / or general mental health. Similar findings have 
been reported in the anxiety field. Individuals with Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
have been successfully trained to interpret novel ambiguous information in a benign 
as opposed to negative manner, subsequently reducing their negative thought 
intrusions (Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, & Mathews, 2010). Furthermore, benign 
interpretations have been induced in adults (Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, & Yiend, 
2007) and children (Vassilopoulos, Banerjee, & Prautzalou, 2009) with high trait 
anxiety scores, and individuals reporting high levels of worry (Hirsch, Hayes & 
Mathews, 2009). These studies are reassuring, as they validate the potential 
therapeutic value of CBM-I in (sub)clinical populations.  
Conclusions 
The current study is the first to show evidence in favour of a depression-linked 
interpretative bias at the early stages of processing. At the 400ms SOA (early stages 
of processing), individuals in the higher depression group showed enhanced 
sensitivity to homophones resolved in a negative as opposed to neutral manner. This 
depression-linked interpretive bias is likely attributable to vulnerability factors, and is 
predicted by cognitive theories of depression (see, Beck, 1976, 1987, 2008; Beck & 
Clarke, 1988; Bower, 1981; DeRaedt & Coster, 2010; Pearsons & Miranda, 1992; 
Sheppard & Teasdale, 2004). However, the mechanisms responsible for inducing 
training-congruent biases at the 800ms SOA (later stages of processing) remain 
unclear. Vulnerability factors are unlikely to be the only cause, as all individuals, 
regardless of whether they were low or high in depression, showed enhanced 
sensitivity to homophones resolved in a training congruent manner. In order to 
differentiate between the two likely mechanisms (emotional category priming and 
transfer of processing) subtle changes to the research paradigm are required.  For 
example, adding unambiguous prime-target pairs to the interpretation phase would 
allow the researcher to assess the possibility of emotional category priming. Further, 
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changing the training task to a lexical decision would shed light on the level of access 
required to induce interpretive biases. Nonetheless, the present study opens the door 
for future CBM-I studies in (sub)clinical depressed populations.  
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 Appendix A 
Zung Self-Rating Depression and Anxiety Scales 
(Depression questions = 1-20; Anxiety questions = 21-40) 
 
Read each sentence carefully. For each statement, select the response that best corresponds 
to how often you have felt that way in the last 2 weeks. 
 
  
A little 
of the 
time 
Some of 
the time 
Good 
part of 
the time 
Most of 
the time 
1. I feel down-hearted and blue         
2. Morning is when I feel the best         
3. I have crying spells or feel like it         
4. I have trouble sleeping at night         
5. I eat as much as I used to         
6. I still enjoy sex         
7. I notice that I am losing weight         
8. I have trouble with constipation         
9. My heart beats faster than usual         
10. I get tired for no reason         
11. My mind is as clear as it used to be         
12. I find it easy to do the things I used to         
13. I am restless and can't keep still         
14. I feel hopeful about the future         
15. I am more irritable than usual         
16. I find it easy to make decisions         
17. I feel that I am useful and needed         
18. My life is pretty full         
19. I feel that others would be better off if I were dead         
20. I still enjoy the things I used to do         
21. I feel more nervous and anxious than usual         
22. I feel afraid for no reason at all         
23. I get upset easily or feel panicky         
24. I feel like I'm falling apart and going to pieces         
25. I feel that everything is all right and nothing bad will happen         
26. My arms and legs shake and tremble         
27. I am bothered by headaches neck and back pain         
28. I feel weak and get tired easily         
29. I feel calm and can sit still easily         
30. I can feel my heart beating fast         
31. I am bothered by dizzy spells         
32. I have fainting spells or feel like it         
33. I can breathe in and out easily         
34. I get feelings of numbness and tingling in my fingers and toes         
35. I am bothered by stomach aches or indigestion         
36. I have to empty my bladder often         
37. My hands are usually dry and warm         
38. My face gets hot and blushes         
39. I fall asleep easily and get a good night's rest         
40. I have nightmares         
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Appendix B 
Context prime-target pairs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Context primes were primarily one syllable words, as the homophone primes 
were primarily one syllable words.   
Prime Target   Prime Target 
Neutral Related Unrelated   Negative Related Unrelated 
arm leg green  abuse beat vomit 
black white bacon  blind deaf argue 
book read boat  burn fire deaf 
cat dog hammer  crash wreck bitter 
chair table brush  cruel evil scold 
clock watch drink  debt owe lonely 
cork screw road  depressed lonely owe 
cow milk open  fat ugly cut 
door open animal  fight argue dirt 
egg bacon dog  fraud fake disease 
elbow knee diary  germs disease dislike 
farm animal head  gloom dull evil 
foot shoe driver  greed selfish dull 
frog green jacket  grief sorrow fake 
hard soft leg  hate dislike fire 
hat head light  loser jerk squeeze 
journal diary knee  pinch squeeze garbage 
jug drink lock  rage anger grave 
key lock elephant  rape victim waste 
lamp light pebble  scar cut conceited 
month year rubber  scorn scold selfish 
paint brush milk  scum dirt smack 
pencil rubber tall  sick vomit wreck 
rock pebble read  sin wrong beat 
ship boat shoe  slap smack ugly 
spray squirt white  snob conceited sting 
street road squirt  sour bitter victim 
tool hammer year  stink garbage anger 
tower tall soft  stupid dumb sorrow 
truck driver screw  tomb grave jerk 
trunk elephant watch  trash waste dumb 
vest jacket table   wasp sting wrong 
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Appendix C 
Valence ratings of selected homophones 
 
Neutral   Negative   
Neutral - 
Negative 
  M SD     M SD     
Bale 3.13 0.83  Bail 2.38 0.92  0.75 
Band 3.63 0.92  Banned 1.75 0.46  1.88 
Blew 2.88 0.35  Blue 2.00 0.76  0.88 
Board 3.13 0.83  Bored 1.38 0.52  1.75 
Brake 3.00 0.53  Break 1.88 0.64  1.13 
Brews 3.00 0.00  Bruise 1.63 0.52  1.38 
Chute 3.00 0.00  Shoot 1.25 0.46  1.75 
Course 3.13 0.64  Coarse 2.25 0.46  0.88 
Dam 3.00 0.00  Damn 1.63 0.74  1.38 
Dye 3.25 0.46  Die 1.00 0.00  2.25 
Find 3.50 1.07  Fined 1.25 0.46  2.25 
Floor 3.13 0.35  Flaw 1.63 0.52  1.50 
Flew 3.63 0.74  Flu 1.13 0.35  2.50 
Fort 3.25 0.46  Fought 1.88 0.64  1.38 
Fowl 2.63 0.74  Foul 1.25 0.46  1.38 
Grown 3.50 0.53  Groan 1.50 0.53  2.00 
Hertz 2.75 0.71  Hurts 1.25 0.46  1.50 
Mall 3.38 0.52  Maul 2.00 1.51  1.38 
Mist 3.25 0.46  Missed 2.13 0.64  1.13 
Morning 3.38 1.06  Mourning 1.38 0.74  2.00 
Mown 2.75 0.46  Moan 1.63 0.74  1.13 
Pane 2.88 0.35  Pain 1.38 0.74  1.50 
Pour 2.88 0.35  Poor 1.38 0.52  1.50 
Sell 3.13 0.35  Cell 2.88 0.64  0.25 
Sleigh 3.50 0.76  Slay 1.63 0.74  1.88 
Soar 3.25 0.89  Sore 1.38 0.74  1.88 
Steel 2.88 0.35  Steal 1.75 1.39  1.13 
Tees 3.00 0.00  Tease 2.25 1.30  0.75 
Tents 3.00 0.00  Tense 1.38 0.52  1.63 
Vein 2.63 0.52  Vain 1.25 0.46  1.38 
Week 2.75 0.71  Weak 2.00 0.00  0.75 
Whale 3.63 0.74   Wail 1.63 0.74   2.00 
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Appendix D 
Valence ratings of excluded homophones. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral   Negative   
Neutral - 
Negative 
  M SD     M SD     
Bald 1.63 0.92  Bawled 1.25 0.71  0.38 
Berry 4.00 0.76  Bury 2.13 0.64  1.88 
Flee 2.25 0.89  Flea 1.13 0.35  1.13 
Hose 3.13 0.35  Hoes 2.38 0.74  0.75 
Know 3.75 0.71  No 2.25 0.89  1.50 
Lone 1.88 0.35  Loan 1.75 0.71  0.13 
Lye 2.33 0.82  Lie 1.38 0.52  0.96 
Patience 4.00 0.53  Patients 2.88 0.83  1.13 
Raw 2.25 0.71  Roar 2.63 1.06  -0.38 
Scull 2.63 0.74  Skull 2.38 0.52  0.25 
Cereal 2.75 0.46  Serial 2.38 0.74  0.38 
Steak 3.50 0.76  Stake 2.75 0.46  0.75 
Earn 3.63 0.92  Urn 2.13 0.64  1.50 
Wine 4.38 0.52   Whine 1.13 0.35   3.25 
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Appendix E 
Homophone prime-target pairs. 
 
Prime Target 
  Related Unrelated 
Neutral / Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative 
bale bail hay court camping nervous 
band banned music forbidden sky ache 
blew hurts wind harms bird sick 
blue hertz volts sad discover sigh 
bored board game tired boils rough 
brake break stop smash sale tired 
brews briuse boils cut ink fault 
cell sell sale jail tunnel harms 
chute shoot tunnel gun river curse 
course coarse obstacle rough snow death 
damn dam river curse stop gun 
die dye ink death night ticket 
find fined discover ticket ground sad 
flaw floor ground fault blood lost 
flu flew bird sick grass smash 
fought fort treehut fight spill deprived 
fowl foul chicken smell glass agony 
groan grown old grunt shopping maim 
mall maul shopping maim old grunt 
mist missed fog lost volts jail 
morning mourning night grief game murder 
mown moan grass sigh day frail 
pain pane glass agony chicken smell 
pour poor spill deprived treehut fight 
slay sleigh snow murder obstacle grief 
sore soar sky ache music forbidden 
steal steel iron rob fog mean 
tees tease shirt mean iron rob 
tense tents camping nervous hay court 
vein vain blood arrogant ocean cry 
wail whale ocean cry shirt arrogant 
weak week day frail wind cut 
 
 
 
 
 
 
